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Comment
REGULATION OF THE VIDEO MARKETPLACE: ACCESS
DUTIES UNDER THE VIDEO DIALTONE ORDER
& THE CABLE TELEVISION CONSUMER
PROTECTION AND COMPETITION ACT OF 1992
ROBERT K. HAHM*
I. INTRODUCTION
The information infrastructure is undergoing a transforma-
tion. Advances in communications and computer technology allow
greater public access to information. The National Information In-
frastructure (NII or Information Superhighway) provides the neces-
sary bridge between the public and the information. The
traditional forms of media; newspaper (data),1 telephone (voice)2
and broadcast (video), and their corresponding legal models
are no longer appropriate models for information distribution on
the NII.3 With advances in communications and computing tech-
nologies, these three media forms are converging. 4 New regula-
tory models must be developed to deal with this changing
environment. 5
* B.S.E., 1990, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1995, Villanova University
School of Law. Prior to entering law school, Mr. Hahm worked five years for E.I.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. His telecommunications experiences at Du Pont
included local and wide area networks, in both voice and data communications.
This experience provided the basis of information relied upon in this Comment.
This Comment is also derived from a paper written for a Computer Science Semi-
nar, taught by Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr. at Villanova University School of Law.
1. See ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 7 (1983).
2. The telephone service represents the common carrier model. For an ex-
planation of the common carrier model, see infra notes 69-83 and accompanying
text.
3. See POOL, supra note 1, at 7-8. Professor Pool notes that the "convergence
of [the] modes of delivery is bringing the press, journals, and books into the elec-
tronic world." Id. at 6. For example, newspapers, such as the Chicago Tribune, the
Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, The Washington Post and The Wall StreetJourna
are electronically available. Michael Meyer, The "On-Line" War Heats Up, NEws
WEEK, Mar. 28, 1994, at 38-39.
4. A good example can be found in the cable industry. Cable can provide
broadcast services, telephone services and newspaper services.
5. Professor Pool states that the "[c]onvergence of modes is upsetting the tri-
furcated system developed over the past two hundred years, and questions that had
seemed to be settled centuries ago are being reopened .... " POOL, supra note 1,
(261)
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The NII means different things to different people. To busi-
nesses and employers, the NII enhances their competitive edge by
allowing greater resource sharing.6 To employees, the NII prom-
ises to be a new source of flexible work practices, including
telecommuting and teleconferencing. 7 To consumers, the NII pro-
vides increased services, including on-line multimedia libraries8 and
home video services on demand.9 These are only some of the pos-
sibilities. The potential benefits of the NII are as boundless as the
imagination.10 However, these benefits can only be achieved by al-
lowing access to the NIL.
This Comment explores access concerns in one area of the
NIL, the video marketplace. Three groups want access to the video
at 7-8. For a general discussion on two possible regulatory models, see infra notes
42-50 and accompanying text.
6. James W. Grudus, Local Broadband Networks: A New Regulatory Philosophy, 10
YALE J. ON REG. 89, 100 (1993). See also Al Gore, Infrastructure for the Global Village,
265 Sci. AM. 150, 152 (1991).
7. Telecommuting allows an employee to work at home by using a telephone
line. The employee dials and connects to any remote resource the employee
needs for his work. Benefits include decreased air pollution (for example, if five
percent of commuters in Los Angeles County telecommute one day a week, they
would save 47,000 tons of pollutants from being emitted), conservation of fuel (for
example, 25% of all motor fuel and 11% of petroleum consumption in 1979 were
due to commuting), increased flexibility (for example, a parent can work at home
while still taking care of his child) and increased productivity (for example, Bell
Atlantic gave 16,000 managers the option to telecommute several days a week, re-
sulting in a dramatic increase in employee productivity). NAT'L TEIECOMMUNICA-
TIONS AND INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NTIA SPECIAL PuB. No. 91-26,
THE NTIA INFRASTRoCtruRE REPORT 3, 73-75 (1991) [hereinafter NTIA Infrastruc-
ture Report]; See also Grudus, supra note 6, at 105-06 (discussing benefits of
telecommuting).
8. On-line multimedia libraries include services such as electronic mail, news,
magazines, newspapers, stock quotes, games, travel reservations and shopping serv-
ices. See Meyer, supra note 3, at 38. On-line multimedia library providers include
Prodigy, CompuServe, America Online, GEnie and Delphi Internet. Id.
9. Grudus, supra note 6, at 103.
10. Senator Conrad Burns of Montana, in his introduction for the Communi-
cations Competitiveness and Infrastructure Modernization Act of 1991, stated that
the NII would become:
[Elvery American's tool of personal emancipation ... [by increasing]
freedom of speech, freedom of choice, freedom of ideas. This will allow
Americans to recapture and expand upon the democratic tradition and
community spirit of the early years of this great Nation by freeing Ameri-
cans from constraints of space and time and will allow civic and economic
participation for all members of this great Republic.
137 CONG. Rc. S7054 (daily ed. June 5, 1991) (comments of Sen. Bums). Cf
Robert J. Samuelson, Lost on the Information Highway, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 20, 1993, at
111 (questioning need for 1000 cable channels and lack of technology to imple-
ment network today).
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REGULATION OF VIDEO MARKETPLACE
marketplace. They are the pipeline providers,11 the programmers 12
and the consumers. The pipeline providers desire access to the
video marketplace because access to the market allows them to
compete for their customers - the consumers and programmers.
Programmers desire access to the pipeline so that their programs
can reach the consumers. The consumers desire access to the pipe-
line so that they can reach the programs offered by the pro-
granrners.
First, this Comment explores the access concerns of each of
these three groups. Second, this Comment analyzes two legal mod-
els that deal with access concerns in the video marketplace. The
models are the Video Dialtone Order 3 and the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (1992 Cable
Act).14 Third, this Comment discusses the legal duties and obliga-
tions created by each of the two models. Although this Paper dis-
cusses access interests in the video marketplace, these models also
apply to the broader NII arena.
II. ACCESS CONCERNS OF PIPELINE PROVIDERS, PROGRAMMERS
AND CONSUMERS
Three groups desire access to the video marketplace: pipeline
providers, programmers and consumers. 15 The desires of each
group change as they interact in the video marketplace. The video
marketplace can be divided into six areas. They are: the pipeline
provider-pipeline provider market, the pipeline provider-program-
11. For purposes of this Paper, pipeline providers provide the communica-
tions platform on which video programs are carried to individual homes. Exam-
ples of pipeline providers are the telephone companies and the cable operators. A
pipeline is composed of channels that carry the video signals. Examples of pipe-
lines are the telephone wires used by the telephone company and coaxial cables
used by the cable operators. Telephone wires can carry multiple channels, with
each channel carrying one voice conversation.
12. For the purposes of this Paper, programmers provide video services in the
cable marketplace. They include on-line libraries, such as CompuServe and Prod-
igy, and cable television programs, such as CNN, ESPN and HBO. Note that "pro-
gram" includes on-line libraries and television programs.
13. Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, §§ 63.54-
63.58, Second Report and Order, Recommendation to Congress, and Second Fur-
ther Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 5781 (1992) [hereinafter Second
Report]; 57 Fed. Reg. 41,106 (1992) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 63 (1994)) [hereinaf-
ter Video Dialtone Order].
14. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-555
(Supp. V 1993)) [hereinafter 1992 Cable Act].
15. Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr., notes that technological innovations have
permitted separation of information and its value-added features from the pipe-
line. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Tort Liability, the First Amendment, and Equal Access to
Electronic Networks, 5 HAR. J.L. & TEcH. 65 (1992).
1995] 263
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mer market,1 6 the pipeline provider-consumer market, the
programmer-pipeline provider market, the programmer-program-
mer market and the programmer-consumer market (these markets
are shown in Table One).17
TABLE 1: RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE VIDEO MARKETPLACE
MARKET SELLER BUYER PRODUCTNUMBER
1 pipeline provider pipeline provider pipeline/
channel 18
2 pipeline provider programmer pipeline/channel
pipeline/channel
3 pipeline provider consumer & content1 9
4 programmer pipeline provider program
5 programmer programmer program
6 programmer consumer program
Generally, a pipeline provider acts as a bridge between a
programmer and a consumer. Therefore, all six markets interact
with each other. For example, the ability of a programmer in the
pipeline provider-programmer market to buy a channel in the pipe-
line affects the ability of that programmer to sell its program to a
consumer in the programmer-consumer market.
Each group has different concerns and goals in desiring access
to the products of the video marketplace - the pipeline and pro-
gram. Also, furthering a goal of one group may hinder the goals of
the other two groups. Therefore, the needs of each group must be
balanced against the needs of the other groups while maximizing
the benefits to each group.
16. For purposes of this Paper, the market is described by listing the seller
first, then the buyer of the product. For example, in the pipeline provider-
programmer market, the pipeline provider sells its product, channels in a pipeline,
to a buyer, a programmer.
17. Markets are usually controlled by supply and demand. ROBERT L. HEIL-
BRONER, UNDERSTANDING MICROECONOMICS 19 (2d ed. 1972). Supply and demand
refer to various quantities of goods or services, the "product," that buyers/sellers
are willing and able to pay/sell at various prices. Id. Both supply and demand are
functional relationships of price and quantity. For example, as demand increases,
product prices increase. Id. As demand decreases, product prices decrease. Id.
18. For purposes of this Paper, a channel on a pipeline carries the signals of a
program. Generally, a pipeline consists of multiple channels. For example, a
pipeline of 50 channels can carry 50 programs.
19. For purposes of this Paper, a pipeline/content denotes programs carried
by a pipeline provider.
[Vol. II: p. 261
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The interests of these three groups implicate both public and
private rights. For example, private parties have a right to enter
into any contract they so desire, but such contracts may restrict the
public's access to the video marketplace, an important national
resource.
20
A. Pipeline as a Product
Pipeline providers supply one of the products in the video mar-
ketplace - the pipelines. These are the means of delivering video
programs. Competitive pipeline providers, programmers and con-
sumers demand access to the pipeline.
Today, there are two types of pipelines available in the video
marketplace. They are fixed pipelines and mobile pipelines.2'
Fixed pipelines include telephone lines, coaxial cable and fiber op-
tics.2 2 Of these three, fiber optics, which can accommodate the
growing demands of the customers, is the most promising pipeline.
20. Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr., in his response to Assistant Secretary Ir-
ving's request for statements regarding the NII, stated that "[t] his electronic super-
highway system should go not only to Disney World and Atlantic City but also to
Washington, state capitols, and industrial parks. Large market potential for en-
tertainment uses of electronic networks should not eclipse support of democracy
and economic productivity." Henry H. Perritt, Statement on the National Infor-
mation Infrastructure, Nov. 30, 1993 (on file with author).
Historically, access to the media has been divided into print and broadcast.
Access rights to the broadcast media are limited because of the scarcity of frequen-
cies. Furthermore, broadcasters have a special responsibility to disseminate a vari-
ety of views on issues of public interest. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468
U.S. 364 (1984) (First Amendment protects right of noncommercial educational
broadcasting stations that receive funding from Corporation for Public Broadcast-
ing to editorialize, without governmental interference); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (if broadcaster meets requirement of "fairness doc-
trine," no obligation to accept editorial advertisements); Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (FCC can impose regulation on radio and televi-
sion broadcasters to require that both sides of public issue be given fair coverage
- "fairness doctrine"). Although the Supreme Court recognized that newspapers
have become big businesses and there are far fewer newspapers currently to serve
the public, the government cannot require access rights to the press. See Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (statute granting political
candidate right to equal space to reply to newspaper criticism violates First Amend-
ment). Today, there is continuing debate to determine if the cable industry
should be regulated as print, broadcast or its own media.
21. See Grudus, supra note 6, at 96-98.
22. Grudus, supra note 6, at 96. A developing area of transport facility is fiber
optics. Both cable operators and telephone companies are developing strategies
for implementing a fiber optic network. See Mary Lu Carnevale, Bell Atlantic's Phone
Network to Carry Cable, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1992, at C15 (Bell Atlantic and Sam-
mons Communications gain FCC approval to construct local fiber optic networks
in three communities beginning in Spring of 1993).
5
Hahm: Regulation of the Video Marketplace: Access Duties under the Vide
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
266 ViLLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM
Fiber optics technology allows larger amounts of information to be
transmitted than were previously possible.23
Mobile pipelines use radio waves to transmit signals.2 4 Current
developments in this area include cellular telephones and Personal
Communications Networks (PCNs)*25 Another example of a mo-
bile pipeline is satellite communication.
In the pipeline provider-pipeline provider market, the pipeline
provider sells channels to its buyer, a competing pipeline provider.
The possibility exists that one pipeline provider may have to use
another pipeline provider's pipeline to reach its customers. A cur-
rent example is that of the telephone system. At the local level,
telephone service is provided by the Bell Operating Companies
(BOCs). When making a long-distance phone call, a consumer
must use the local telephone lines to reach the long-distance tele-
phone lines. In essence, the long-distance carrier has no direct link
to the consumers, and it must depend upon the local telephone
pipeline to connect the long-distance consumer to the long-dis-
tance pipeline.
Programmers also want to buy channels supplied by the pipe-
line providers, creating the pipeline provider-programmer market.
In relation to other programmers, a programmer desires equal abil-
ity to buy channels on a pipeline. In some instances, a pipeline
provider supplies the pipeline and owns a financial interest in a
programmer, thereby creating a vertically integrated pipeline pro-
vider and programmer.2 6 A vertically integrated pipeline provider
has great incentive to favor its programs over that of its competitors.
A non-affiliated programmer, one not associated with the pipeline
23. Assume a customer has to transfer the entire contents of the Library of
Congress. By using a standard 14.4 kilobits per second modem over a telephone
line, the transfer will take 170 years. By using fiber optics, with a transmission rate
of 2.488 gigabits per second, the entire contents can be transmitted in one day.
Grudus, supra note 6, at 95. For a description of the benefits of fiber optics, see
generally id. at 94-106.
24. Grudus, supra note 6, at 97-98. There is an increasing popularity among
consumers to use mobile transmissions. Previously, mobile transmission technol-
ogy was thought to be saturated because of the limited bandwidth that was avail-
able. POOL, supra note 1, at 113-16. By 1925, eighty-nine broadcast channels had
been allocated, and it was agreed that there was no more room. However, cell
technology divides each bandwidth into smaller cells, allowing more people to
share the limited bandwidth.
25. A full discussion on fixed and mobile transmissions is beyond the scope of
this Paper. For a more extensive discussion of this area, see Grudus, supra note 6,
at 96-98.
26. 47 U.S.C. § 521 (a) (5) (Supp. V 1993). A pipeline provider that supplies
the pipeline and the programs is vertically integrated. Id. For a discussion on
vertical integration, see infra notes 178-82.
[Vol. II: p. 261
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provider, wants access to the pipeline on an equal and non-discrimi-
natory basis. Equal access assures that fair competition exists
among all the programmers, regardless of pipeline provider
affiliation.
By ensuring equal access to a pipeline channel, affiliated and
non-affiliated programmers can compete fairly to reach the con-
sumers. In essence, the pipeline acts as a bridge between a
programmer and a consumer. A programmer needs access to a
pipeline so that the programmer can supply its product, the pro-
grams, to the consumers. However, a programmer's desire to ac-
cess the pipeline conflicts with a pipeline provider's desire to
control the content carried over its pipeline.2 7 This conflict affects
the pipeline provider-programmer market and the programmer-
pipeline provider market.2 8 In some instances, the pipeline may be
of limited size. Thus, a pipeline provider would like to decide
which programs it can carry to meet the demands of its customers.
Furthermore, if a pipeline provider has a financial interest in a par-
ticular programmer, that pipeline provider may not provide access
to the pipeline to a competitive programmer.
Lastly, consumers want to buy both the channels and content
available on a pipeline, creating the pipeline provider-consumer
market. First, consumers desire access to the pipeline, not for
"pure" access to the pipeline but to reach the contents carried on
the pipeline. Access to a pipeline without access to the programs
would be meaningless to a consumer. A consumer buys access to a
pipeline to reach the programs located on the pipeline.
Furthermore, a consumer does not care which pipeline he uses
to gain access to programs. As long as the pipeline is transparent to
the consumer, access to the programs can be accomplished by any
means.29 For example, assume a consumer wishes to watch his fa-
vorite television show. It does not matter to a consumer whether
27. Control over content creates First Amendment and liability questions.
Both issues are beyond the scope of this Paper. For a discussion of First Amend-
ment concerns and possible attendant liabilities, see Perritt, supra note 15; Sympo-
sium, The Congress, the Courts and Computer Based Communications Networks:
Answering Questions About Access and Content Contro, 38 ViL. L. REv. 319 (1993)
[hereinafter Access and Content Control].
28. Both markets are affected because a pipeline provider may not wish to sell
its channel space to a programmer and a programmer may not wish to sell its
program to a pipeline provider. However, this Section will only discuss the pipe-
line provider-programmer market.
29. An example of a transparent pipeline is the long-distance telephone ser-
vice. When a caller uses a pay-phone and dials long-distance, he wants to be con-
nected to the person at the other end of the call. The caller cares little about the
long-distance carrier, whether it be AT&T, MCI or Sprint. Of course this example
1995]
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the television signals are carried by a broadcast or a cable
pipeline.30
In the pipeline provider-consumer market, a pipeline provider
wishes to control its ability to sell pipeline content to a consumer.
At first, this may seem illogical. But, consider a situation where a
consumer lives in a very remote area where the cost of installing
coaxial cable to the consumer's home is expensive. In this instance,
the pipeline provider may wish to forgo its potential revenues due
to the associated installation costs.3' These were the same concerns
the telephone industry experienced in providing access to rural
areas.
3 2
In addition, a consumer wishes to buy a pipeline channel sup-
plied by the pipeline provider. Examples of channel service in-
clude the telephone service and electronic mail.3 3 A pipeline
provider, however, may wish to control channel access of a con-
sumer. For example, a consumer can send electronic mail
messages which contain negative views of a pipeline provider. A
pipeline provider would like to restrict access to any consumer who
has negative views of that pipeline provider.3 4
The possibility exists that selling its pipeline channel to a
programmer affects the ability of a pipeline provider to sell its pipe-
line content to a consumer. A pipeline provider sells to program-
mers and consumers; however, selling a pipeline channel to a
programmer affects the content of the pipeline. If the program
negatively affects the content of the pipeline, the consumer de-
mand for access to the pipeline will decrease. Therefore, the possi-
bility exists that selling channel space to a programmer will
decrease the consumer's demand for the pipeline. Conversely, if a
assumes that the cost and quality of the services are equivalent among the long-
distance telephone carriers.
30. Note that this does not factor in picture quality, service and price that a
consumer must consider when making a choice between broadcast or cable recep-
tion. One of the main reasons for starting the cable industry was poor signal re-
ception via broadcast. For a history of the cable industry, see infra notes 158-85
and accompanying text.
31. Ninety percent of homes in the United States now have access to cable. S.
REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1991).
32. The telephone industry, as a common carrier, could not discriminate
among its customers. 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1988). However, the problem of high
installation cost was minimized because the phone company, as a monopoly, could
subsidize its operations in rural areas with revenues from cities and businesses.
33. Electronic mail is similar to the mail service but the messages are in elec-
tronic form.
34. For a discussion of a recent case of a programmer, CompuServe, threaten-
ing to discontinue a user's access, see infra note 156.
[Vol. 11: p. 261
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pipeline provider sells pipeline channels based on consumer de-
mand, a pipeline provider can lose revenue from programmers that
are willing to pay the pipeline provider more money for the same
channel.
B. Program as a Product
The second product in the video marketplace, the programs, is
supplied by the programmers. Pipeline providers, competitive pro-
grammers and consumers all want access to the programs. 35
In the programmer-pipeline provider market, a pipeline pro-
vider desires to buy programs supplied by a programmer. One of
the major concerns of a pipeline provider is access to the programs.
As mentioned previously, a consumer buys access to a pipeline for
the content available on a pipeline and not for "pure" access to a
pipeline. Without the ability of a pipeline provider to buy pro-
grams, a pipeline provider will not be able to attract consumers to
its pipeline.
Similar to the pipeline provider-programmer market, a verti-
cally integrated programmer3 6 may refuse to sell its programs to a
non-affiliated pipeline provider in the programmer-pipeline pro-
vider market. For example, assume a vertically integrated program-
mer and pipeline provider compete with a non-affiliated pipeline
provider in the same market. An integrated programmer will be
reluctant to sell its programs to a non-affiliated pipeline provider
that competes with its affiliated pipeline provider. If the integrated
programmer sells its program to a non-affiliated pipeline provider,
35. The programmer's ability to control the content of its programs are be-
yond the scope of this Paper. With content control, First Amendment and tort
liabilities are implicated. For example, if a consumer had posted a message on a
bulletin board, such as Prodigy, advertising "Gun for Hire," the question arises
whether the programmer would be liable for any injury caused by that message.
See generally Access and Content Control, supra note 27.
In the publishing context, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit held Soldier of Fortune magazine liable for compensatory damages caused by
its negligent publication of an advertisement stating "GUN FOR HIRE," which cre-
ated a substantial danger of harm to the public. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune, 968
F.2d 1110, 1119 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1028 (1993) (footnotes
omitted). See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985) (in private figure-private interest context, private figure can recover dam-
ages in defamation action without showing of actual malice); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (in private figure-public interest context, actual
malice not required, but need fault before magazine can be liable for defamation);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public figure context re-
quires showing of actual malice before damages for defamation will be enforced
against newspaper).
36. For a description of vertical integration, see supra note 26 and accompany-
ing text and infra notes 178-82.
1995] 269
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that programmer may sell its program to a non-affiliated pipeline
provider for higher discriminatory prices than it would to its affili-
ated pipeline provider. Therefore, equal access to a program is a
strong interest of a non-affiliated pipeline provider.
In the programmer-programmer market, a programmer
desires to buy programs offered by a competitive programmer. For
example, assume Programmer A provides a menu service which lists
a variety of programs which can be accessed on a pipeline. Assume
also that the menu service is a very popular feature with consumers.
Programmer B would like to have its programs listed on Program-
mer A's menu to increase its visibility to consumers.
In the programmer-consumer market, a consumer seeks access
to programs supplied by the programmers. As stated previously, a
consumer is mainly interested in access to a specific program or a
wide diversity of programs. Arguably, a diversity of programs serves
the public interest by increasing the number of ideas available in
the marketplace, increasing citizen participation in government
and promoting individual liberty.3 7
Consumers will choose only those programs they value. If a
consumer is a sports fan and watches only sports programs, that
consumer may just want access to sports channels. He may not be
interested in other programming. In this instance, the consumer is
willing to pay for access to the sports channels but not for access to
the comedy channels.3 8 Another consumer, equally a fan of sports,
may want the ability to access the sports channels and additional
programming. Thus, consumer demand drives the market both for
specific and diverse programming.3 9
A consumer's desire for diversity and choice in programming,
however, often conflicts with a programmer's desire to bundle pro-
37. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing) ("the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market.").
38. 47 U.S.C. § 522(19) (Supp. V 1993). Cable operators currendy tier or
bundle their services for which a separate rate is charged by the cable operator. Id.
The Basic Service bundle may include broadcast stations. 47 U.S.C. § 522(4)
(Supp. V 1993). The Extended Basic Service bundle may include such stations as
ESPN, CNN and MTV. Premium services include HBO, Showtime and The Movie
Channel. Each bundle is one price and the premium channels are priced individ-
ually. 47 U.S.C. § 522(19) (Supp. V 1993). As such, a consumer who pays for
access to the Extended Basic bundle will receive all programs within that bundle.
The consumer's desire to access some of the programs in that bundle is irrelevant.
39. Wide ranges of choices include diversity of programs (for example: news,
sports and comedy programs) and more than one choice per type of program (for
example, in the movie-type programs: HBO, Showtime and The Movie Channel).
(Vol. II: p. 261
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grams. A programmer4° wants to bundle the programs available on
the pipeline so that it can tie41 one program to another program.
Generally, a tying-program is a program which a pipeline provider
or consumer desires to buy. That program is then sold either with a
less popular program or a new program with little notoriety. By
tying the two products together, a programmer sells both its popu-
lar and unpopular programs in one bundle. This usually restricts
the ability of a pipeline provider and a consumer to choose and buy
the programs they desire in both the programmer-pipeline pro-
'ider and programmer-consumer markets.
Pipeline providers oppose tying for efficiency reasons. With-
out tying, a pipeline provider is free to amass popular shows and to
offer a greater diversity in programming. Tied programs hinder a
pipeline provider's ability to sell channels to other programs that
are in demand, thereby improving pipeline content. Thus, im-
proved pipeline content increases consumer demand for a pipeline
provider's services, resulting in increased profits.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE VIDEO DIALTONE ORDER AND THE 1992
CABLE Ac-r
Today, technological advances in telecommunications are im-
pacting both the practical and regulatory philosophies of the field.
These advances have blurred the distinction among print, broad-
cast and common carriers. 42 As a result, the regulatory policy has
shifted from a philosophy of managed monopoly to one of man-
aged competition.43
The trend in telecommunications is, paradoxically, one of frag-
mentation and convergence. 4 The centralized networks of old
40. Bundling of programs involves programmer-pipeline provider and pro-
grammer-consumer markets.
41. For the definition of "tying," see infra note 60.
42. For a discussion of common carriers, see infra notes 69-72 and accompa-
nying text.
43. A very important aspect of any regulation of the video marketplace is the
First Amendment. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law . . .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . . " U.S. CONST.
amend. I. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that cable providers engage
in conduct protected by the First Amendment. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439
(1991) (cable is defined as purveyors of messages, not just message bearing elec-
tronic impulses).
The First Amendment issues are complex, and most of its ramifications can-
not be discussed in this Paper. For a discussion of First Amendment rights, see
Perritt, supra note 15.
44. MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAw § 1.1, at
2 (1992 & Supp. 1993).
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have fragmented into many smaller and autonomous parts that cre-
ate more networks, lines and switches.45 For example, before di-
vestiture, AT&T controlled the majority of the telephone market.46
However, technological innovations, such as microwave and fiber
optics, allowed other telephone carriers into the market.
As interconnections among networks proliferate, distinct
boundaries in the communications area are disappearing and con-
verging.47 For example, television was always described as a wireless
broadcast. Today, with cable television, television programs are be-
ing transmitted over cable. In contrast, telephone calls were mainly
transmitted over telephone lines. Now, telephone calls are crossing
into the wireless area with the advent of cellular technology.
Furthermore, the telecommunications market is moving from
a heavily regulated market into one favoring competition. 48 Ad-
vances in telecommunications have made this possible. The econ-
omy of scale and large investment costs which initially justified the
concept of a natural monopoly in the telecommunications field are
no longer valid assumptions. As mentioned above, fragmentation
has created an environment where many competitors can now co-
exist. With increased fragmentation, consumers have a greater
choice in selecting the programs they desire. 49
The Video Dialtone Order and the 1992 Cable Act are new
regulatory attempts to provide equal access to the video market-
place. Depending upon the model, certain access rights are em-
phasized while others are de-emphasized. However, any model
chosen is a method of regulating the availability of video services,
either by government or private parties.50
45. Id.
46. For a discussion of the divestiture of AT&T, see infra notes 102-15 and
accompanying text.
47. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 44, at 2.
48. Id. § 1.1, at 3; ROGER G. NOLL, TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION TODAY
AND TOMOitOw 42 (Eli M. Noam ed., 1983).
49. "The information infrastructure will... resemble an old-fashioned village
market. A multitude of goods and services will be bought and sold through this
new information marketplace . . . ." Grudus, supra note 6, at 100 n.54 (quoting
Michael L. Dertouzos, Communications, Computers and Networhs, Sci. AM., Sept. 1991,
at 62, 67).
50. In the telecommunications arena, of which cable is a subset, many govern-
mental agencies are responsible for its regulation. These include Congress, courts
(AT&T's MFJ order), the FCC and the NTIA. Many players are involved in regulat-
ing the telecommunications marketplace, therefore, a consistent regulatory mes-
sage should be adhered to by all parties.
[Vol. II: p. 261
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A. Competition, Monopolies and Antitrust
Arguably, competition is the best way to allocate resources.5 1
Competition creates the greatest benefit by allocating resources to
people or groups that offer the best quality product and services at
the lowest price. In addition, competition protects the public from
unscrupulous business practices.
In contrast, monopolies frustrate the natural regulation of the
business by the marketplace. In a monopoly, there is only one
seller of a good or service.52 No competition exists, and a monopo-
listic business can set prices at the highest point where demand is
sustained at an acceptable level. Therefore, legal controls or regu-
lations are justified as a substitute to competition.53
A monopoly can create anti-competitive behavior both in adja-
cent markets that supply the monopolist and in adjacent markets
that the monopolist supplies.54 Antitrust laws seek to prevent these
inefficiencies by ensuring equal access. Furthermore, courts have
consistently upheld the argument that competition allocates market
resources in the most efficient manner.55
To promote competition in the marketplace, Congress passed
the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act) .56 The Sherman Act was
enacted to enforce the belief that "unrestrained interaction of com-
petitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic re-
51. The United States Supreme Court noted that "the assumption that com-
petition is the best method of allocating resources in a free market recognizes that
all elements of a bargain - quality, service, safety and durability - and not just
the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among
alternative offers." National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679, 695 (1978). See generally Grudus, supra note 6, at 106-07; John M. Stevens,
Antitrust Law and Open Access to the NRE, 38 VILL. L. Rlv. 571 (1993).
52. HEILBRONER, supra note 17, at 119.
53. Grudus, supra note 6, at 107.
54. For a description of possible anti-competitive behaviors by a monopolist,
see infra notes 58-63.
55. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). The Supreme
Court stated:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of eco-
nomic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the
rule of trade. It rests on the premise that unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic re-
sources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material
progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to
the preservation of our democratic and social institutions.
Id. at 4. See also, National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679 (1978) (discussing suppression of competition between bids for -engineering
services under the Sherman Act).
56. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et
seq. (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
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sources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest
material progress.. . ."57 Five types of anti-competitive monopolis-
tic behaviors have been targeted as unacceptable under the Sher-
man Act.5 They are essential facilities,59 tying,6° leveraging and
refusals to deal, 61 predatory pricing and cross-subsidy62 and transfer
pricing and self-dealing. 63
Initially, the telecommunications industry was subject to com-
mon carriage regulation 64 because it was thought to be a natural
57. Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 4.
58. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 44, §§ 3.2.1-2.5, at 139-45.
59. Id. § 3.2.1, at 139. The "essential facilities" doctrine requires a company
with a monopoly power in one market to deal fairly with competing firms operat-
ing in adjacent markets that depend upon the monopolist for essential inputs. Id.
at 139-40. This doctrine prevents a monopolist from acquiring power in an adja-
cent competitive market. Id.; See United States v. Terminal R.R., 224 U.S. 383
(1912) (requiringjoint owners of railroad switching junction to afford competing
railways access to it upon just and reasonable terms). The four elements of the
doctrine are as follows: (1) control of an essential facility by a monopolist, (2) a
competitor's inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility,
(3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor and (4) the feasibility of
providing the facility. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 44, § 3.2.1, at 139.
60. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 44, § 3.2.2, at 140. Justice O'Connor stated
that "[t]ying is a form of marketing in which a seller insists on selling two distinct
products or services as a package." Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 33 (1984). See KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 44, § 3.2.2, at 142. Justice
O'Connor set three criteria as follows: (1) seller must have power in the market
tying-product market, (2) threat that seller will acquire market power in the tied-
product market which has no other stable sellers or high entry barriers and (3)
there must be coherent economic basis for treating the tying and tied products as
distinct. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 37-39.
61. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 44, § 3.2.3, at 142-43. Antitrust prohibits lever-
aging and refusal to deal. Id. at 142. In leveraging, a monopolist uses its monop-
oly power in one market to exploit that power in a second market. Id. By a boycott
or refusal to deal with a company, a monopolist can impede or eliminate competi-
tion. Id. at 142-43. Market foreclosure is similar to leveraging. Id. at 143. A mo-
nopolist obtains control over a second market because it supplies the market. Id.
A monopolist can demand exclusive contracts and withhold necessary supplies
from competitors. Id.
62. Id. § 3.2.4, at 143-44. In predatory pricing, a monopolist sells its products
below cost with the intent of driving competition out of the market. Id. at 143.
However, aggressive pricing is allowed. Id. at 144. The United States Supreme
Court noted that predation is rarely tried and even more rarely successful. Matsu-
shita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 595-98 (1986). See gener-
ally KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 44, § 3.2.4, at 144.
A monopolist is also prevented from cross-subsidization. Id. A cross-subsidy
occurs when a monopolist subsidizes its interests in other markets with revenues
from its monopoly market. Id.
63. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 44, at §§ 3.2.1-.2.4, at 139-44.
64. See Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-218, § 7, 36 Stat. 539, 544
(1910) (declaring telephone and telegraph services to be common carriers). A
communications common carrier is defined as "[a] ny person engaged in render-
ing communications service for hire to the public." 47 C.F.R. § 21.2 (1994). For a
detailed discussion on common carriers, see Perritt, supra note 15, at 73-91. Other
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monopoly.65 As a result, common carrier regulations were devel-
oped to prevent natural monopolies from taking advantage of their
customers.66 However, some argue that governmental regulation
created the monopoly in the telecommunications industry.6 7
B. Traditional Common Carrier Model (Video Dialtone Order)
The Video Dialtone Order 6 is analogous to the common car-
rier regulation in the video marketplace. Before analyzing the
Video Dialtone model, this Paper defines common carrier and
video dialtone, develops the history of the telephone industry and
discusses the provisions of the Video Dialtone Order.
1. Common Carnier
Under common law, a firm is designated as a common carrier
if it is affected with a public interest, occupies a monopoly position
and holds itself open to the general public.69 As a common carrier,
the firm is required to charge reasonable and nondiscriminatory
rates, provide adequate services and accept all customers on the
same terms, without discrimination. 70
common carriers include the transportation industry, including railroads and
trucks. Id. at 75. They have also been subject to common carriage requirements.
Id.
65. "Many industry observers describe traditional local telecommunication
networks as inherently monopolistic, lacking in any competitive pressure."
Grudus, supra note 6, at 107. Moreover, the telephone market was viewed as a
natural monopoly due to the high cost of the fixed plant, declining average cost of
service and the need for all customers to interconnect with one another. KELLOGG
ET AL., supra note 44, § 1.1, at 1.
A "natural monopoly" is defined as "one resulting where one firm of efficient
size can produce all or more than market [sic] can take at remunerative price."
BLACK'S LAw DIcrIONARY 1007 (6th ed. 1990). See also KELLOGG ET AL., supra note
44, § 9.1, at 423.
66. For a description of common carrier regulations, see infra notes 69-83
and accompanying text.
67. Some argue that "telecommunications is an 'unnatural monopoly,' that is,
a monopoly put in place by government decree." Jack High, Introduction: A Tale of
Two Disciplines, in REGULATION ECONOMIc THEORY AND HISTORY 1, 11, 15-16 (Jack
High ed., 1991), cited in Grudus, supra note 6, at 107. See also NOLL, supra note 48,
at 45. In addition, the possibility exists that pervasive government regulation can
be destructive and inefficient in areas of technological innovation. A regulated
entity may not innovate for fear of regulatory risk. Grudus, supra note 6, at 107
n.102.
68. Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, §§ 63.54-
63.58, Second Report and Order, Recommendation to Congress, and Second Fur-
ther Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 5781 (1992).
69. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 44, § 1.3.1, at 12.
70. Perritt, supra note 15, at 73. If a common carrier refused to do so, the
aggrieved party could bring an action for mandamus or trespass. A mandamus
action is used to compel the common carrier to serve the aggrieved party as re-
1995]
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A court's determination of a firm as a common carrier revolves
around the definitions of "common" and "carrier." First, a firm
must be found to be a "carrier," and, if so, the "carrier" must be
"common." A firm is considered to be a "carrier" if the firm: (1)
provides services for hire, (2) engages primarily in the business in
question and (3) regularly engages in the transportation service.71
A firm is considered to be "common" if it: (1) holds itself out to the
public as willing to serve all, (2) serves the public without discrimi-
nation, (3) performs its transportation function in the public's
interest and (4) does not control the content of the goods
transported. 72
A telecommunications common carrier is subject to the Fed-
eral Communications Commission's (FCC) regulation if the entity's
service constitutes interstate communications and is rendered to
the public for hire.73 Generally, courts look to the common law to
apply the definitions of common carriers.74
Common carrier regulation by the FCC has the following char-
acteristics: (1) a common carrier files a tariff with the FCC,75 which
may be subject to FCC approval, 76 (2) a common carmer may not
discriminate unreasonably among its customers in charges, prac-
tices, classifications, regulations, facilities or services, 77 and (3) new
firms can enter the common carrier market only by demonstrating
quired by its obligations. Id. at 73-74. A trespass action is brought to recover dam-
ages caused by failure to serve. Id.
71. Id. at 81-82.
72. Id. at 82-84.
73. In the Matter ofGraphnet Sys., Inc., 73 F.C.C.2d 283, 288-89 (1979). Per-
ritt, supra note 15, at 85 n.91. The FCC has jurisdiction over communications car-
riers. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). "Communications" is
defined as "transmission [by wire or radio] of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and
sounds of all kinds ... including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and
services . . .incidental to such transmission." 47 U.S.C. § 153 (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
However, the FCC has limited the scope of statutory common carrier obliga-
tions by distinguishing between basic services and enhanced services, and between
data processing and communications. Perritt, supra note 15, at 87. Basic services
and communications systems (e.g., packetizing) are regulated as common carriers,
but enhanced services (e.g., anything more substantial than basic transmission)
and data processing (e.g., protocol conversion) are not. Id. at 87-88.
74. Perritt, supra note 15, at 85.
75. 47 U.S.C. § 203 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). A tariff is a public statement of
the terms and conditions of service that a public utility provides. See KLLOG ET
AL., supra note 44, § 12.10, at 629.
76. See 47 U.S.C. § 201(a), (b) (1988); 46 Fed. Reg. 10,924, 10,926 (1981).
77. 47 U.S.C. § 202 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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that their entrance into the market serves public convenience and
necessity.78
The telephone industry is a good example of a common car-
rier.79 The government provides telephone companies with the
privilege to run their telephone wires to homes by using the govern-
ment's eminent domain power. Moreover, the government pro-
vides a measure of protection to an existing telephone company
against a competing telephone company's entrance into that mar-
ket. The FCC requires that a competing telephone company plan-
ning to enter a market already serviced by a telephone company
must show that public convenience and necessity will be served.80
This requirement often creates a de jure or "unnatural" telephone
monopoly in that market because the burden of proof is
substantial.
In return, a telephone company must provide telephone ser-
vice to anyone who wants access."' Furthermore, it is unlawful for a
telephone company to charge "unjust or unreasonable" rates, and
the telephone company must file a tariff which governs the tele-
phone company's relationship with its customers.82 Finally, there
can be no discrimination, preference or different charges to differ-
ent customers for like services under like circumstances.83
78. See 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1988).
79. The Federal Communications Act of 1934 stated that the telephone com-
pany had to provide service to all customers at just and reasonable prices. 47
U.S.C. § 201(a), (b) (1988). In addition, new companies could compete in the
telephone market only if they demonstrated public convenience and necessity. Id.
at § 214(a). The telephone monopoly was required to provide connection to the
new companies only if the Commission found such connection necessary or desira-
ble in the public interest. Id. at § 201(a). This Act also created the Federal Com-
munications Commission. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
80. See 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1988).
81. As the Supreme Court stated, "[a] common-carrier service in the commu-
nications context is one that makes a public offering to provide [communications
facilities] whereby all members of the public who choose to employ such facilities
may communicate or transmit intelligence of their own design and choosing .... "
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 (1979) (footnote omitted). See
KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 44, § 2.12.1, at 113 n.4. An exception is made if the
telephone company can show good cause for not providing the service.
82. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988).
83. Courts, interpreting 47 U.S.C. § 202, have found absolute obligation of
carriers to avoid discrimination in charges with respect to like communication
services, regardless of particular customer needs or public objectives. Western
Union v. FCC, 568 F.2d 1012, 1018 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978);
American Trucking Assoc. v. FCC, 377 F.2d 121, 130 (D.D.C. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 943 (1967). See KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 44, § 2.12.4, at 116.
1995]
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2. Video Dialtone
A metaphor of the video dialtone is the telephone's audio di-
altone.84 When a telephone consumer wishes to speak to another
person, the consumer lifts the telephone hand-set, hears an audio
dialtone, dials the number of the person or service he wishes to
reach, and the consumer is connected to that service.
A video dialtone performs a function similar to that of an au-
dio dialtone. In the telephone service, a consumer generally wishes
to speak to another person.8 5 In the video area, the consumer
wants access to the various programs available on the network.
These services include on-line data libraries,8 6 sporting events, 8 7
movies,88 shopping channels8 9 and interactive services. 90 Likewise,
a consumer using a video dialtone9l "picks up the hand-set" by turn-
ing on the television, sees a menu of service options on the televi-
sion screen, selects a service and connects to that service.
3. History: Previous Acts, Regulations and Court Decisions
To fully comprehend the genesis of the Video Dialtone Order,
the history and regulation of the telephone company must be un-
derstood. There are many players involved in the regulation of the
telecommunications market: Congress, the courts and three agen-
cies - the FCC, the National Telecommunications and Informa-
tion Administration (NTIA)92 and the Department of Justice
(DOJ). Generally, Congress enacts statutes which authorize agen-
cies to regulate an entity. The 1984 Cable Act93 and the 1992 Cable
84. The audio dialtone lets the consumer know that the telephone is ready to
be used. If the consumer hears no sound, then the consumer knows that the call
will not be connected.
85. The telephone companies also offer other services, such as call-waiting,
party-line and answering services.
86. Examples of on-line data libraries are CompuServe and Prodigy.
87. Sporting events include sports channels, such as ESPN and Pay-Per-View.
88. Movie channels include HBO, Showtime and The Movie Channel.
89. QVC is an example of a shopping channel.
90. Currently, there are no true interactive services available in the video mar-
ket, but test areas are currently being planned.
91. For a detailed discussion on the video dialtone, see Robert L. Pettit &
Christopher J. McGuire, Video Dialtone: Reflections on Changing Perspectives in Tele-
communications Regulations, 6 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 343 (1993).
92. Congress determined that "[t]elecommunications and information are vi-
tal to the public welfare, national security, and competitiveness of the United
States." 47 U.S.C. § 901(b) (1) (Supp. V 1993). NTIA has various duties, including
the authority to develop and set forth telecommunications policies, conduct stud-
ies in telecommunications and coordinate telecommunication activities in the ex-
ecutive branch. See 47 U.S.C. § 902(b)(1)(A)-(T) (Supp. V 1993).
93. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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Act94 are examples of such enactments. The Video Dialtone Order
is an example of a regulation by the FCC. Courts are involved in
the telecommunications arena to determine the validity of statutes
and regulations.95 In antitrust actions, the DOJ and the courts are
involved in deciding whether a firm's actions violate the Sherman
Act. An example of a settlement in an antitrust action is the Modifi-
cation of Final Judgment (MFJ).96
The main regulator of the telecommunications industry is the
FCC. In 1876, Alexander Graham Bell patented a device which
evolved into the modern telephone. 97 At that time, Bell confidently
predicted that "a telephone in every house would be considered
indispensable... ."98 During the 1900's, American Telephone and
Telegraph Company (AT&T or Bell) became the major supplier of
telephone service in the country.99 Due to AT&T's enormous mar-
ket share, the government first regulated AT&T as a common car-
rier in 1910.100 As a common carrier, AT&T had to provide service
on request, at just and reasonable rates, and without unjust discrim-
ination or undue preference. 1° 1
Prior to divestiture, AT&T held eighty-five percent of the local
telephone market and ninety percent of the long-distance mar-
ket. 102 In November 1974, the DOJ filed its third antitrust suit1
0 3
94. See supra note 14.
95. Turner Broadcast Systems, Inc. v. FCC is an example of the cable industry
challenging the constitutionality of the 1992 Cable Act in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated, 114 S.
Ct. 2445 (1994).
96. For a description of the MFJ, see infra notes 102-15 and accompanying
text.
97. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 44, § 1.2.1, at 6.
98. Id. (citing ROBERT W. GARNET, THE TELEPHONE ENTERPRISE: THE EVOLU-
TION OF THE BELL SYSTEM'S HoRIzoNTAL STmUCTURE, 1876-1909, at 12 (1985)).
99. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 44, § 1.3, at 11. AT&T enjoyed its large market
share by buying its competitors or not allowing its competitors to use its advanced
long-distance technology. Id.
100. Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-218, § 7, 36 Stat. 539, 544
(1910). Telegraph and telephone carriers were originally regulated by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission (ICC).
101. Mann-Elkins Act §§ 7, 12. The Act did not require common carrier's
obligations to be applied to other carriers. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 44, § 1.3.2,
at 15.
102. Grudus, supra note 6, at 108.
103. The DOJ had filed two previous antitrust suits against AT&T. KEiLOGG
ET AL., supra note 44, § 4. In the first antitrust suit, the DOJ alleged that AT&T was
becoming a monopoly by acquiring all independent phone companies. Id. § 4.2,
at 200. This resulted in the 1914 Decree, in which AT&T agreed to refrain from
acquiring any more competing independent telephone companies. United States
v. AT&T, 1 Decrees & Judgments in Civil Federal Antitrust Cases 554 (D. Or.),
modified, 1 Decrees &Judgments in Civil Federal Antitrust Cases 569 (D. Or. 1914),
19951
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against AT&T.' °4 Under Judge Greene,10 5 AT&T and the DOJ
agreed to settle.10 6 On January 8, 1982, the DOJ and AT&T filed a
stipulation with the District Court of New Jersey, called the Modifi-
cation of Final Judgment (MFJ). 1 07 Two years after the MFJ, divesti-
ture of AT&T was complete. By the terms of the MFJ agreement,
AT&T kept the long-distance carrier portion of the business, as well
as Bell Core,108 but the local carriers were split into seven in-
dependent Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) or Bell
Operating Companies (BOCs). 1°  Today, the long-distance service
providers have equal access to the local exchanges. 110 Further-
more, the seven BOCs continue to be regulated as common carri-
modified, 1 Decrees &Judgments in Civil Federal Antitrust Cases 572 (D. Or. 1918),
modified, 1 Decrees &Judgments in Civil Federal Antitrust Cases 574 (D. Or. 1922).
In 1956, the government brought its second antitrust suit against AT&T. KELLOGG
ET AL., supra note 44, § 4.3, at 202. The government alleged that AT&T's practices
of acquiring and licensing patents on telecommunications equipment and services
created a monopoly. Id. The case was resolved by the 1956 Decree. United States
v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956). In the de-
cree, AT&T agreed to grant non-exclusive licenses to all interested parties for all
existing and future AT&T patents. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 44, § 4.3, at 203-04.
104. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982). The complaint
alleged that Bell had a monopoly in both long-distance service and manufacture of
telecommunications equipment. United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1342
(D.D.C. 1981).
105. The case was initially assigned to Judge Joseph C. Waddy who became
terminally ill in 1978. The case was then reassigned to Judge Greene on his first
day on the federal bench. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 44, § 4.4, at 207.
106. Id. § 4.5, at 211. The antitrust trial started on January 15, 1981. Id. at
208. After the government presented its case, AT&T moved for a directed verdict.
Judge Greene denied the motion and wrote a lengthy opinion. United States v.
AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336 (D.D.C. 1981). Shortly after this opinion, AT&T and
Assistant Attorney General William Baxter agreed to settle the case. KELLOGG ET
AL., supra note 44, §§ 4.4-.5, at 210-11.
107. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 140-41 (D.D.C. 1982) [herein-
after 1982 Decree]. Under the terms of the MFJ, Judge Greene retained jurisdic-
tion to hear triennial reviews on the BOCs restriction to enter certain lines of
business. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
108. BellCore is the research center for AT&T.
109. 1982 Decree, supra note 107, at 229. The MFJ had four basic provisions.
KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 44, § 4.6, at 221. First, AT&T was required to divest
itself of the local Bell telephone operating companies. 1982 Decree, supra at 227.
Second, the BOCs were required to provide non-discriminatory connections to
long-distance carriers. Id. Third, BOCs were prohibited from the long-distance,
information services and equipment businesses. Id. Fourth, it freed AT&T from
the restrictions of the 1956 Decree. Id. at 226. See generally KELLOGG ET AL., supra
note 44, § 4.6, at 221 (describing the main provisions of the 1982 Decree).
The seven BOCs that were created were Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth,
NYNEX, Pacific Telesis, Southwestern Bell and US West.
110. Id. § 1.7, at 41. For a detailed discussion on the rise and fall of the Bell
System, see id. §§ 1.2-.7, at 5-48.
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ers. There is also a requirement to divide the functions of the local
exchanges into separate components."1
Even with the break up of AT&T, the BOCS were not allowed
into the video marketplace for fear of anti-competitive behavior to-
wards the emerging cable industry. n 2 This prohibition was formal-
ized by the 1984 Cable Act." 3 Likewise, the FCC ordered all
telephone common carriers to stop providing cable service "di-
rectly or through their telephone service areas."" 4 However, tele-
phone companies were allowed to carry video programs to rural
areas. 115
111. Id. § 1.8, at 52. With Open Network Architecture (ONA), the plan is to
disaggregate the individual components of a telephone connection (the line, sig-
naling - dial and busy tones - and the switching) into basic service elements
that can be priced and sold separately and as a part of an integrated enhanced
service. Id. The goal of ONA is to vault telephone service from POTS, "Plain Old
Telephone Service," to PANS, "Pretty Amazing New Services." Id. By disaggrega-
tion, ONA hopes to provide consumers and other producers universal access to
the telephone network, similar to that in the long-distance market. Id.
112. By the terms of the 1956 Consent Decree, the Bell System was prohibited
from offering anything other than rate-regulated "common carrier" services.
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956).
Furthermore, in Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Laramie Community TV Co., the
FCC determined that cable providers were not common carriers because they de-
termined the content of the programs they transmitted. 24 F.C.C. 251, 254 (1958).
A major concern was that the telephone companies could cross-subsidize their
video market service with profits from their traditional telephone service.
113. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Star.
2782 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 521 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) [hereinafter 1984 Cable
Act]. For a discussion on the 1984 Cable Act, see infra notes 169-71 and accompa-
nying text. The 1984 Cable Act formalized the cross-ownership ban, forbidding
common carriers from providing "video programming" in its service area. "It shall
be unlawful for any common carrier ... to provide video programming directly to
subscribers in its telephone service area, either directly or indirectly through an
affiliate owned by, operated by, controlled by, or under common control with the
common carrier." 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1) (1988). It should be noted that this sec-
tion is commonly described as the "cross-ownership" prohibition, but the 1984
Cable Act only prohibits programming, not ownership. In contrast, the provision
prohibits telephone companies from providing programming services, but a cable
operator can provide telephone services.
114. 47 C.F.R. § 63.54(a) (1994). The cross-ownership prohibition does not
bar telephone companies from owning cable systems outside their service area.
Today, BOCs are trying to enter the cable market by buying or merging with ex-
isting cable operators. SeeAndrew C. Barrett, ShiftingFoundations: The Regulation of
Telecommunications in an Era of Change, 46 FED. COM. L.J. 39, 43-47 (1993) (explain-
ing merger and alliances between Bell Atlantic and Tele-Communications, Inc.;
Viacom and Paramount; NYNEX and Viacom; US West and Time Warner; Bell-
South and Prime Management; and Southwestern Bell and Hauser Communica-
tions). However, this merger mania may have subsided with the fall of the Bell
Atlantic-TCI merger. The merger is thought to have failed because of the FCC's
decision to require cable companies to lower their rates.
115. 47 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1988). The Cable Act of 1992 maintains the rural
exemption. "This subsection shall not apply to any common carrier to the extent
such carrier provides telephone exchange service in any rural area (as defined by
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4. Video Dialtone Order
During the 1980's, the FCC recognized the increased market
power of cable companies and their monopoly-like dominance in
their respective regions. 116 The FCC determined that the tele-
phone companies were no longer a threat to the cable industry.
The cable industry had developed from an infant industry requir-
ing protection to a dominant power in the video marketplace. 1 7
The FCC wanted to allow telephone companies into the video
market, but the FCC was limited by the 1984 Cable Act's prohibi-
tion against the telephone companies entrance into the program-
ming market.118 The FCC determined that the 1984 Cable Act
prohibited a telephone company from actively participating in the
distribution of programs to consumers within the local company's
service area.119 However, the FCC also determined that the 1984
Cable Act did not prohibit a telephone company from offering
video dialtone services which passively carry programs provided by
other programmers.1 20 As a result, the Video Dialtone Order allows
the telephone companies to carry programs, but the telephone
companies are not permitted to select video programs or determine
how the programs will be presented for sale to the customers.
12
'
the Commission)." 47 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1). See H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 56 (1984) ("It is the intent of section 613(b) to codify current FCC rules
concerning the provision of video programming over cable systems by common
carriers, except to the extent of making the exemption for rural telephone compa-
nies automatic.").
116. Second Report, supra note 13, at 5783; see infra notes 172-83 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the monopoly-like power of the cable industry
prior to the 1992 Cable Act.
117. Second Report, supra note 13, at 5783.
118. See Pettit & McGuire, supra note 91, at 349. Many people believed that
the telephone company was prohibited from providing video dialtone under the
1984 Cable Act's cross-ownership ban. Id.
119. Second Report, supra note 13, at 5786 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1)).
120. Id. at 5783. In determining that the telephone industry could provide
the pipeline for the programmers, the FCC first had to determine that the passive
transporting of programs was not covered by the 1984 Cable Act. Pettit & Mc-
Guire, supra note 91, at 349-50. The FCC focused on the definition of "cable ser-
vice," primarily on the meaning of "transmission." Id. at 351-52. The FCC rejected
the argument that "transmission" included passively transporting signals generated
by a programmer to a subscriber. Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-
Ownership Rules, §§ 63.54-63.58, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsid-
eration, 7 F.C.C.R. 5069, 5071 (1992). Instead, the FCC determined that "trans-
mission" required "active participation in the selection and distribution of video
programming." Id. See generaUy Pettit & McGuire, supra note 91, at 350-51.
121. Video Dialtone Order, supra note 13, at 41,107. The telephone compa-
nies are prohibited from "making decisions concerning the bundling or 'tiering,'
of the price, terms and conditions of video programming offered to consumers, or
otherwise have a cognizable financial interest in, or exercise editorial control over,
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Before the FCC issued the Video Dialtone Order, the FCC de-
termined that section 533(b) of the 1984 Cable Act 122 did not pro-
hibit telephone operators from providing video dialtone.12 3 The
video programming provided directly to subscribers within their telephone service
areas." Id. Non-cognizable telephone company ownership in video programmers
was increased from one percent to five percent. Id.
122. Section 533(b) of the 1984 Cable Act states:
§ 533. Ownership restrictions
(a) Persons owning or controlling television station licensee; holding li-
cense for multichannel distribution or offering satellite service
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to be a cable operator if such
person, directly or through one or more affiliates, owns or controls, the
licensee of a television broadcast station and the predicted grade B con-
tour of such station covers any portion of the community served by such
operator's cable system.
(b) Common carriers; direct video programming; exception; waiver
(1) It shall be unlawful for any common carrier, subject in whole or in
part to subchapter II of this chapter, to provide video programming di-
rectly to subscribers in its telephone service area, either directly or indi-
rectly through an affiliate owned by, operated by, controlled by, or under
common control with the common carrier.
(2) It shall be unlawful for any common carrier, subject in whole or in
part to subchapter II of this chapter, to provide channels of communica-
tions or pole line conduit space, or other rental arrangements, to any
entity which is directly or indirectly owned by, operated by, controlled by,
or under common control with such common carrier, if such facilities or
arrangements are to be used for, or in connection with, the provision of
video programming directly to subscribers in the telephone service area
of the common carrier.
(3) This subsection shall not apply to any common carrier to the extent
such carrier provides telephone exchange service in any rural area (as
defined by the Commission).
(4) In those areas where the provision of video programming directly to
subscribers through a cable system demonstrably could not exist except
through a cable system owned by, operated by, controlled by, or affiliated
with the common carrier involved, or upon other showing of good cause,
the Commission may, on petition for waiver, waive the applicability of
paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection. Any such waiver shall be made
in accordance with section 63.56 of title 47, Code of Federal Regulations
(as in effect September 20, 1984) and shall be granted by the Commis-
sion upon a finding that the issuance of such waiver is justified by the
particular circumstances demonstrated by the petitioner, taking into ac-
count the policy of this subsection.
47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1988).
123. Second Report, supra note 13, at 5787 n.21. The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia determined that section 533(b):
prohibits a telephone company from directly providing video program-
ming to subscribers in its service area. Significantly, the statute has not
been interpreted to prohibit a local telephone company from providing
video transport services. Thus, a telephone company is permitted to run
a cable into a subscriber's home and then to lease channels of communi-
cations on that cable to unaffiliated entities, such as cable operators. The
telephone company only runs afoul of the statute by exercising control or
discretion over the programming transported over its facilities.
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909, 929 (E.D. Va.
1993) (citations omitted).
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1984 Cable Act prohibited common carriers from acting as a cable
operator or from providing cable service over a cable system.
Therefore, determining the definitions of "cable service," 12 4 "cable
system" 125 and "cable operator"12 6 was crucial in allowing telephone
companies to provide video dialtone. The FCC defined these terms
narrowly and found that passive transport of programs did not fall
within the 1984 Cable Act's prohibitions.12 7 In the future, the ques-
tion remains whether the telephone companies can actively partici-
124. The 1984 Cable Act defines cable service as "(A) the one-way transmis-
sion to subscribers of (i) video programming, or (ii) other programming service,
and (B) subscriber interaction, if any, which is required for the selection of such
video programming or other programming service." 47 U.S.C. § 522(5) (A)-(B)
(Supp. V 1993).
125. The 1984 Cable Act defines a cable system as:
a facility consisting of a set of closed transmission paths and associated
signal generation, reception, and control equipment that is designed to
provide cable service which includes video programming and which is
provided to multiple subscribers within a community, but such term does
not include (A) a facility that serves only to retransmit the television sig-
nals of 1 or more television broadcast stations; (B) a facility that serves
only subscribers in 1 or more multiple unit dwellings under common
ownership, control, or management, unless such facility or facilities uses
any public right-of-way; (C) a facility of a common carrier which is sub-
ject, in whole or in part, to the provisions of title II of this act, except that
such facility shall be considered a cable system . . . to the extent such
facility is used in the transmission of video programming directly to sub-
scribers; or (D) any facilities to any electric utility used solely for operat-
ing its electric utility system.
47 U.S.C. § 522(7) (Supp. V 1993).
126. The 1984 Cable Act defines a cable operator as "any person or group of
persons (A) who provides cable service over a cable system and directly or through
one or more affiliates owns a significant interest in such cable system, or (B) who
otherwise controls or is responsible for, through any arrangement, the manage-
ment or operation of such a cable system." 47 U.S.C. § 522(4) (Supp. V 1993).
127. First, the FCC determined that the definition of "cable service" did not
include the passive transport of program signals. It noted that the Congressional
record showed that "transmission," which was in the definition of cable service,
only included "active participation in the selection and distribution of video pro-
gramming." Memorandum and Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 7
F.C.C.R. 5069, 5071 (1992). The Video Dialtone Order did not allow the tele-
phone companies to select the programs, therefore, they were not providing cable
service.
Second, the FCC concluded that the telephone facilities used to provide video
dialtone were not a "cable system." The FCC determined that the telephone facili-
ties were covered by the exemption for common carrier services governed by Title
II of the Communications Act. Id. at 5072. Therefore, the FCC reasoned that
Congress did not intend telephone facilities to be governed by both regulations.
Id. Moreover, the FCC concluded that telephone facilities did not ordinarily in-
clude equipment for signal generation, reception and control, which form the
cable system. Id. at 5072-73.
Third, the FCC determined that the definition of "cable operator" did not
include a telephone company which provided video dialtone. The definition of a
"cable system" was a part of the definition for a "cable operator." Because the
telephone facilities did not fall within the definition of a "cable system," telephone
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pate in the selection and distribution of video programs. The FCC
recommended that the 1984 Cable Act be amended to allow tele-
phone companies to provide video programming directly to sub-
scribers. 28 However, Congress, in its 1992 Cable Act, kept intact
the 1984 Cable Act's prohibition against the telephone companies
from directly providing programs to consumers. 129 This prohibi-
tion, however, has been held unconstitutional under intermediate
First Amendment scrutiny by two federal circuit courts' 3 0 and three
district courts.131
In Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. United States,132 the
Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Virginia (C&P)
and Bell Atlantic Video Services Company, both wholly owned sub-
sidiaries of Bell Atlantic, challenged the legality of sections (1) and
(2) of 47 U.S.C. § 553(b)13 3 which prohibited telephone companies
and their affiliates from providing video programming to subscrib-
ers within their service area. C&P alleged that the prohibition vio-
lated their First Amendment right to free expression.1 4 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with
C&P that section 533(b) was unconstitutional.13 5
The appellate court first determined that the regulation was
content-neutral; 136 therefore, it was subject to the intermediate
companies did not fall within the definition of a "cable operator." See Pettit &
McGuire, supra note 91, at 349-52.
128. The FCC recommended that § 533(b) be eliminated. In re Telephone
Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Further Notice of Inquiry and
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 3 F.C.C.R. 5849 (1988).
129. Congress believed that the § 533(b) ban enhanced competition in the
cable industry. S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1991).
130. US West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1994); Chesapeake
& Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd, 42
F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994).
131. NYNEX Corp. v. United States, No. 92-323-P-C (D. Maine 1994); Bell-
South Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994); Ameritech Corp.
v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. 111. 1994).
132. 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994). The
Chesapeake & Potomac case is used to illustrate the reasoning courts have used to
hold § 533(b) as unconstitutional.
133. For the relevant provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1988), see supra note
113. Video programming is defined as "programming provided by, or generally
considered comparable to programming provided by, a television broadcast sta-
tion." 47 U.S.C. § 522(19) (Supp. V 1993).
134. Chesapeake & Potomac, 42 F.3d at 185.
135. Id.
136. A regulation is content-neutral if "the government has adopted a regula-
tion of speech because of [agreement or] disagreement with the message it con-
veys." Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2459 (1994)
(quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 791 (1989)). Turner required a
two-step analysis to determine whether a regulation was content-neutral. Chesa-
1995] 285
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level of scrutiny under United States v. O'Brien.137 The court
stated that a content-neutral regulation was constitutional (1) if
the interests of section 553(b) were significant, (2) if section
553(b) was narrowly tailored to serve those interests and (3)
if section 553(b) left open ample alternative channels for
communication of information. 13 8 Although the court found
that the government did have a significant interest,13 9 the
court held that the regulation was not narrowly tailored, 140 and
peake & Potomac, 42 F.3d at 192-93. First, the court held that the regulation, on its
face, did not confer benefits or impose burdens based upon the content of the
speech it regulated because § 533(b) prohibited a telephone company from pro-
viding video programming regardless of the message it conveyed. Id. at 193. See
Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2459 (whether plain terms of regulation, on its face, confers
benefits or imposes burdens based upon content of speech). Second, the court
found that the purpose of § 533(b) was not to regulate speech because the regula-
tion was enacted to prevent telephone companies from exercising its monopolistic
practices in the cable transport market and to preserve diversity of ownership of
electronic means to access to homes and businesses. Chesapeake & Potomac, 42 F.3d
at 195. See Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2461 ("[A] regulation neutral on its face may be
content-based if its manifest purpose is to regulate speech because of the message
it conveys.").
137. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Under the O'Brien analysis, a content-neutral regu-
lation is constitutional if the regulation serves a significant governmental interest
and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to serve these inter-
ests. Id. at 377. Moreover, the regulation must " 'leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information.'" Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). See
Chesapeake & Potomac, 42 F.3d at 198.
138. Chesapeake & Potomac, 42 F.3d at 198.
139. Id. The goals of § 533(b) were to restrict a telephone company from
cross-subsidizing the video market with its telephone operations and to restrict
pole-access discrimination. Id. Pole-access discrimination is important in the cable
market because cable operators initially hung their coaxial cables, the physical
transport which carried video signals, from utility poles that were owned solely by
local telephone companies. Id. at 186. First, the court held that these goals pro-
mote the elimination of unfair trade practices. As such, "the government's interest
in eliminating restraints on fair competition is always substantial, even where the
individuals or entities subject to particular regulations are engaged in expressive
activity protected by the First Amendment." Id. (quoting Turner, 114 S. Ct. at
2470). Second, these goals enhanced diversity of ownership outlets. Id.
"[A]ssuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a
governmental purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values central to the
First Amendment." Id. (quoting Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2470). Moreover, the court
held that multiplicity of information sources were critical in the cable market be-
cause of private control of cable communication through a physical bottleneck -
the physical access point of cable into a home or office. Id.
140. Id. at 202. The court stated that a regulation " 'need not be the least-
restrictive or least-intrusive means' of achieving the government's goal" to be con-
sidered narrowly tailored. Id. at 199 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 798). The require-
ment of narrow tailoring is satisfied "so long as the . . . regulation promotes a
substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation." Id. (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (footnote omitted) (quoting United
States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985))). However, the regulation may not
[Vol. II: p. 261
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it did not provide ample alternative channels for communica-
tion. 141
5. Video Dialtone Order: Policy Goals and Effects
The Video Dialtone Order's policy goals are to "creat[e]
opportunities and incentives to develop an advanced telecommuni-
cations infrastructure, increas[e] competition in the video market-
place, and enhanc[e] the diversity of video services to the American
public in order to promote consumer choice."142 The FCC used
three means to further these goals. First, the FCC extended the
existing telephone regulations against discriminatory access 143 and
cross-subsidization to the video dialtone services. Second, addi-
tional safeguards can be imposed as part of a section 214 certifica-
tion process. 1 " Third, the FCC will review the Video Dialtone
"burden substantially more speech than was necessary to further the government's
legitimate interest." Ward, 491 U.S. at 799.
The court found that § 533(b) was not narrowly tailored because the govern-
ment failed tojustify a need for § 533(b) and it burdened more speech than neces-
sary. Chesapeake & Potomac, 42 F.3d at 202. In determining whether a regulation
was narrowly tailored, the court should afford great deference "to the decisions of
Congress and the experience of the [FCC]." Id. at 199 (citing CBS, Inc. v. Demo-
cratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973)). But this deference was limited to
congressional factual findings regarding the need for the regulation, including a
determination of whether any less burdensome alternative existed. Id. (citing City
of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1510 n.13 (1993)). First,
the court noted that Congress failed to support § 533(b) with any underlying fac-
tual findings. Id. at 201. Second, the court held that:
[an] 'obvious less-burdensome alternative[ ]' to Section 533(b) readily
presents itself .... Congress could simply limit the telephone compa-
nies' editorial control over video programming to a fixed percentage of
the channels available; the telephone companies would be required to
lease the balance of the channels on a common carrier basis to various
video programmers, without regard to content.
Id. at 202 (quoting Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp.
909, 930-31 (E.D. Va. 1993)).
141. Chesapeake &Potomac, 42 F.3d at 203. The court stated that "[w]hether a
regulation leaves open ample alternative methods of communication is more than
an inquiry as to whether the regulation 'completely silences' the speaker." Id. A
regulation was constitutional if ample alternative methods of communication were
sufficiently similar to the method foreclosed by the regulation. Id. However,§ 553(b) bared absolutely the ability of telephone companies to enter, with edito-
rial discretion, the cable television market. Id.
142. Video Dialtone Order, supra note 13, at 41,106.
143. Second Order, supra note 13, at 5823. This requirement was met by re-
quiring the telephone companies to provide a common carrier platform with suffi-
cient capacity to service multiple video programmers. Id.
144. Id. at 5823. In General Tel. Co. of Cal., 13 F.C.C.2d 488 (1968), aff'd,
413 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1969), the FCC held that in order for a telephone com-
pany to provide channel service to a cable system, the telephone company was
required to seek FCC approval under § 214 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 214 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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Order in three years to ensure that the policy goals are being
met. 145
In addition, the Video Dialtone Order shows the FCC's shift in
emphasis from "regulated monopolies" to "regulated competition."
To reach this goal, the Video Dialtone model is designed to create
greater choice for the American consumer in both programs and
pipelines, while retaining enough flexibility to accommodate tech-
nological advances.
First, the Video Dialtone model increases the number of pro-
grams a consumer can access. By increasing the number of poten-
tial video pipelines, consumers have the potential to access an
increased number of programs. With increased competition, the
FCC concluded that consumers will have more choice in content,
an increase in responsive customer service and lower prices for
video programming. 146
Second, the model provides for increased competition in the
existing pipeline. Before the Video Dialtone Order went into ef-
fect, one cable operator usually provided all video programs within
a geographic region. 147 By allowing telephone companies to carry
video programs, a consumer will have at least two pipelines from
which to choose: a cable operator or a local telephone company.
The telephone company will be a multi channel competitor to the
cable operators. However, because the telephone companies are
prohibited from owning a cable system, the telephone companies
have to build their own broadband networks in order to compete
with existing cable systems.148
Third, the language of the Video Dialtone Order indicates the
FCC's flexibility to accommodate technological developments in
the video dialtone industry. In addition, the Video Dialtone Order
does not violate the FCC's interpretation of section 533(b) of the
1984 Cable Act.' 49 Otherwise, the FCC seems content to allow the
technology and the market to drive the video dialtone services. 150
145. Second Order, supra note 13, at 5823.
146. Id. at 5797-98.
147. Congress stated that "most cable television subscribers have no opportu-
nity to select between competing cable systems. Without the presence of another
multichannel video programming distributor, a cable system faces no local compe-
tition." Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
148. Telephone companies are not prohibited from ownership of cable oper-
ators outside their service area.
149. The prohibition usually prevents a telephone company from being a
"cable operator," providing "cable service" through a "cable system."
150. As the FCC stated:
[Vol. II: p. 261
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6. Duties Imposed by the Video Dialtone Order
The Video Dialtone model is analyzed by determining the du-
ties and rights it creates among the three groups who want access to
the model: the pipeline providers, programmers and consumers.
It only imposes common carrier duties upon the telephone compa-
nies and not upon the cable operators, but, for purposes of this
model, this Paper assumes that it creates similar duties for all pipe-
line providers.
The Video Dialtone Order only regulates one product, the
pipeline. Therefore, only three of the six markets are regulated by
the Video Dialtone model, the pipeline provider-pipeline provider,
the pipeline provider-programmer and the pipeline provider-con-
sumer markets. The ability to buy and sell programs is not ad-
dressed by the Video Dialtone Order.
First, the pipeline provider is required to provide nondiscrimi-
natory access to the pipeline to competing pipeline providers, pro-
grammers and consumers. If a programmer wants access to a
pipeline, a pipeline provider must sell access to the pipeline in a
nondiscriminatory fashion.' 51 The pipeline provider cannot unrea-
sonably refuse to sell available channel space to a programmer.
This model defeats the dangers found in vertical integration. 152 If a
firm owns both pipeline and program, the potential exists for that
company to favor its affiliated programs over that of its competitors.
However, the nondiscriminatory access requirement provides equal
access to the pipeline both for non-affiliated programmers and affil-
iated programmers. Likewise, a consumer can buy access to a pipe-
line in nondiscriminatory fashion. Consistent with common
carriage, a consumer must be given access to a pipeline, even if the
consumer is located in a remote area. Access to all consumers is
Given the rapid pace of technological development in this area, our pol-
icy initially sets only the necessary broad regulatory framework and relies
upon the technical and market creativity of those in the private sector
responding to market demand and economics to determine the sub-
stance of telephone company video dialtone offerings.
Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 5781, 5788-89 (1992).
151. Video Dialtone Order, supra note 13, at 41,107. This assumes that the
pipeline has empty channels for the pipeline provider to sell. The Video Dialtone
Order does not require a specific number of channels a pipeline provider must
have, however, it does state that "the telephone companies provide a common
carrier platform containing sufficient capacity to service multiple video program-
mers." Id.
152. In the video marketplace, vertical integration occurs when the video pro-
grams and the pipelines used to carry the video signals are owned by the same
company.
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crucial, given the important role that the video marketplace will
have in the distribution of information.153
Unlike pipelines, the Video Dialtone Order does not regulate
programs. There is no duty for a programmer to sell access to its
programs.1  Three problems arise in this situation. First, a
programmer can decide whether to sell a program to a particular
pipeline provider. This can create a problem for a pipeline pro-
vider. A pipeline provider can sell its pipeline to a consumer only if
that pipeline contains content that the consumer wishes to access.
If a pipeline does not contain programs that a consumer desires,
the consumer will not buy access to that pipeline. Second, a domi-
nant program can gain monopoly-like dominance. 55 The Video
Dialtone Order does not address the imbalance of power that can
be created among the pipeline providers, programmers and
consumers. Third, programmers can arbitrarily refuse to sell their
programs to consumers. Without any programmer regulation, a
programmer can refuse or cancel a consumer's access to its
program.15 6
However, any attempts to regulate programmers can run afoul
of the First Amendment.1 57 In addition, regulation of program-
mers under a common carrier regulation conflicts with the com-
mon law definition of a common carrier. One element in the
definition of common carrier requires a firm not to control the
content being transported, however, a programmer does control
153. See 47 U.S.C. § 901 (b) (2) (Supp. V 1993).
154. Attempts to regulate programmers can implicate First Amendment
rights. See generally Perritt, supra note 15.
155. Examples of dominant programs are LEXIS/NEXIS and Westlaw in the
law database services. In cases of a monopoly, antitrust laws may be implicated to
ensure equal access. For a discussion of antitrust law, see supra notes 56-63 and
accompanying text.
156. Recently, CompuServe has threatened to cancel one of its user's Com-
puServe accounts. Brian Livingston, CompuServe Threatens Free Exchange of Ideas over
Lawsuit, INFoWoRLD, March 7, 1994, at 25. Currently, CompuServe and Richard S.
Patterson are involved in a dispute concerning the trademark right to "Windows
Navigator." Id. In conjunction with the suit, CompuServe sent the following letter
to Mr. Patterson: "[I] t is CompuServe's position that you will be terminated if you
mention, discuss, or comment upon the lawsuit or the issues related thereto as part
of the CompuServe Information Service. Termination will also result from any
other disparagement of CompuServe, its management, employees, or business
practices." Id. Although it is understandable that CompuServe does not want Mr.
Patterson to talk about the pending case, CompuServe should not have the ability
to terminate his account for disparaging remarks because termination may impli-
cate First Amendment rights. For a discussion on the First Amendment implica-
tions, see Access and Content Control, supra note 27.
157. For a discussion of First Amendment concerns, see Perritt, supra note 15.
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program content. Thus, under traditional common law, a program-
mer cannot be considered a common carrier.
C. The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992
The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992 (1992 Cable Act) is another model which has been used
to regulate the video marketplace. In analyzing the 1992 Cable Act,
the history of cable television, the Cable Communications Policy
Act of 1984 (1984 Cable Act) and the access provisions and duties
created by the 1992 Cable Act are discussed.
1. History: Previous Acts, Regulations and Court Decisions
During the 1940's and 1950's, cable television originated in the
mountainous and rural areas, because the terrain made television
reception poor or nonexistent.158 Community antenna televisions
(CATV or Cable TV), built on top of hills and tall buildings, were
able to receive the television signals.1 59 Then, the cable operators
distributed the signals to homes by coaxial cable.160
It was not until 1965 that the FCC exercised jurisdiction over
cable television.' 6' The Communications Act of 1934 applied to
"all interstate and foreign communication by wire and radio," and
included FCC responsibility to "make available... to all the people
of the United States a rapid, efficient, nation-wide and world-wide
wire and radio communication service." 162 The Supreme Court, in
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 163 determined that the FCC
could regulate the cable industry because it was "reasonably ancil-
lary to the effective performance of the Commission's various re-
sponsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting."' 64
In Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, Inc.,165 the broadcast companies
sued cable systems for violating the broadcasters' copyrights by re-
laying their broadcasts without paying royalties. The Supreme
158. KELLOGO ET AL., supra note 44, § 14.1, at 689.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. POOL, supra note 1, at 157. The FCC has wide jurisdiction in the tele-
communications area. The Communications Act of 1934 gives the FCC power over
"all interstate and foreign communication by wire and radio" and the FCC has a
duty to "make available ... to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient,
nation-wide and world-wide wire and radio communication service." Id. at 161.
162. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
163. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
164. Id. at 178.
165. 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
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Court held that CATV was an extended antenna for a subscriber of
the cable system. As such, cable companies did not have to pay
royalties for transmitting signals that were broadcast without
charge. 166 In reaction to the Supreme Court's decision, Congress
amended the copyright law in 1974. The amendment provided
that cable operators had to pay royalties for retransmission of
broadcast signals. 167 Also, broadcasters had to give compulsory
licenses to the cable operators.1 68
Congress deregulated the cable industry by the Cable Commu-
nications Policy Act of 1984 (1984 Cable Act).169 The 1984 Cable
Act was enacted to promote "competition in cable communica-
tions" because Congress believed that cable would face effective
competition from other multichannel video program dis-
tributors. 170 In addition, Congress believed that the cable industry
needed protection from the well established telephone
companies.17'
Unfortunately, the 1984 Cable Act did not have its intended
effect. Rather than increasing competition in the cable market,
the cable industry became the "dominant nationwide video me-
dium."172 Almost 56,000,000 households, over sixty percent of the
total number of households with television, subscribed to cable tele-
vision.1 73 Additionally, cable service was accessible to almost ninety
percent of the nation. 74 "For a variety of reasons, including local
franchising requirements and the extraordinary expense of con-
structing more than one cable television system to serve a particular
166. CATV was free from any copyright liability.
167. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 119 (1976 & Supp. V 1993).
168. The amendment balanced two federal interests in the video marketplace
by ensuring the broadest dissemination of broadcast programs while protecting
the rights of copyright owners. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1993).
169. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-59 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
170. Other multichannel video program distributors include wireless cable,
Satellite Master Antenna Television (SMATV), television receive only (TVRO or
home satellite dish) and direct broadcast satellite (DBS).
171. See supra note 113.
172. 47 U.S.C. § 521(a)(3) (Supp. V 1993). In 1970, cable television had
about 4.5 million subscribers. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 44, § 14.1, at 690. By
1990, the number of cable television subscribers had increased to 54 million, and
over 80 million residents had access to the cable networks. Id. The dramatic in-
crease in the penetration of the cable industry compares to that of the telephone
market. In 1934, telephone service was available to only one out of three house-
holds. By 1984, approximately 98% of Amercian households had at least one tele-
phone. Paul MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, Losing by Judicial Policymaking: The
First Year of the AT&TDivestiture 2 YALE J. ON REG. 225, 230 n.29 (1985).
173. 47 U.S.C. § 521(a) (3) (Supp. V 1993).
174. S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1991).
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geographic area. . . " the cable companies became a monopoly
with no effective competitors within each of their geographic mar-
ket areas.' 75 As a consequence, the "average monthly cable rate in-
creased almost three times as much as the Consumer Price Index
since rate deregulation." 176
Congress found that the cable industry had become horizon-
tally1 77 and vertically178 integrated. 179 This integration created anti-
competitive tendencies between cable operators and programmers
and between cable operators and other multichannel competitors.
Likewise, integration affected access to the pipeline by program-
mers and access to programs by pipeline providers. In either case,
the total number of programs and pipelines available to the con-
sumers decreased.
Vertical integration causes two problems. First, a vertically in-
tegrated cable operator can restrict or condition the ability of pro-
grammers to access the pipeline. An integrated cable operator has
the incentive and ability to favor its affiliated programmer. This
makes it more difficult for non-affiliated programmers to secure
carriage on an integrated cable operator's pipeline.'8 0 Second, a
vertically integrated cable programmer can restrict or condition the
access of pipeline providers and consumers to programs. An inte-
grated cable programmer has the incentive to favor its affiliated
cable pipeline. Similarly, an integrated programmer can refuse to
offer its programs to competing cable pipelines or alternative tech-
175. 47 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
176. Id. § 521(a) (1).
177. Horizontal concentration refers to the share of cable subscribers ac-
counted for by the largest Multiple System Operators (MSOs). H.R. REP. No. 628,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1991) [hereinafter House Report]. Nicholas W. Allard,
The 1992 Cable Act: Just the Beginning, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 305, 313 n.31
(1993). In 1985, approximately 29% of all cable subscribers were served by the top
five MSOs. S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1991) [hereinafter Senate
Report]. At the end of 1990, the top five MSOs served almost half of the nation's
subscribers. Id. Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI) served approximately 24% of
the nation's subscribers, Time Warner's cable subsidiary reached 12%, and the
next three largest cable operators reached 11%. Id.; House Report, supra at 42-43;
Allard, supra at 313 n.31.
178. Vertical integration occurs when a cable operator and a cable program-
mer have common ownership or financial interests. 47 U.S.C. § 521 (a) (5) (Supp.
V 1993). For example, TCI, the largest cable system operator, has a financial inter-
est in programming services such as American Movie Classics, the Discovery Chan-
nel, QVC Networks, Inc. and Encore. Viacom has a financial interest in MTV,
Showtime, Nickelodeon and VH-1. Both TCI and Viacom have a financial interest
in Home Box Office (HBO). Senate Report, supra note 177, at 24-29; House Re-
port, supra note 177, at 41.
179. 47 U.S.C. § 521(a) (5) (Supp. V 1993).
180. Id.
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nologies for delivering video signals.'" In addition, an affiliated
programmer can offer its programs to competing pipelines at dis-
criminatory prices. This has the effect of reducing the diversity of
programs available to the public.'82
Horizontal integration also decreases the availability of pipe-
line providers and diversity of programs. First, horizontal integra-
tion affects program availability to competing pipeline providers. A
horizontally integrated cable operator uses its monopoly-like power
to control independent programmers. Fearful of losing their larg-
est customer, programmers are willing to enter into exclusive
licenses with a horizontally integrated pipeline provider, reducing
the number of programs available to competing pipeline providers.
In essence, the number of programs and pipelines available to the
public decreases. Second, horizontally integrated cable operators
can perpetuate the problems of vertical integration. A horizontally
integrated operator can condition its carriage of the programmer's
program upon the cable operator's ability to acquire a financial in-
terest in a programmer. 183 Once a cable operator becomes either
vertically or horizontally integrated, the cable operator has an in-
centive to perpetuate the problem. In essence, vertical integration
can create horizontal integration, and horizontal integration can
cause vertical integration.
Congress reacted to the effects of the 1984 Cable Act by enact-
ing the 1992 Cable Act.'8 4 Congress enacted the 1992 Cable Act to
181. Senator Inouye commented that "cable operators who own program
services have consistently denied dish owners and other multichannel video serv-
ices programming or made the programming available at prices much higher than
those paid by cable operators." 138 CONG. REc. S563-64 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1992)
(comments of Sen. Inouye).
182. NBC originally planned to produce a cable news channel to compete
with CNN. 138 CONG. REc. S426 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Gore). However, the cable system which partly owned CNN threatened not to
carry NBC's new program. Id. As a result, NBC did not create a competing news
program. Id. In this instance, however, a new program format was created. NBC
changed the format of the news program to a financial and consumer news chan-
nel. Id. Because the new program did not compete with CNN, the new program
was carried by the affiliated pipeline provider. Id.; Allard, supra note 177, at 314
n.39.
183. See Senate Report, supra note 177, at 23-28; House Report, supra note
177, at 36-40.
184. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-55 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). As an interesting fact, the
1992 Cable Act was the only congressional act passed despite President Bush's veto.
The U.S. Senate voted 74-25 to override the veto. 138 CONG. Rc. S16,676 (daily
ed. Oct. 5, 1992). The U.S. House of Representatives voted 308-114 to override
the veto. 138 CONG. REc. H11,487-88 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992).
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ensure that cable operators faced competition and that the con-
sumers were receiving the best possible service for its cost.185
2. The 1992 Cable Act and Its Provisions'86
The 1992 Cable Act's policy goals were to promote the avail-
ability and diversity of views in the video market, use the market as
the primary regulatory tool in the video marketplace and protect
consumers and programmers by ensuring that cable operators did
not have undue market power in relation to the consumers and
programmers.1 87 In the furtherance of its objectives, the 1992 Cable
Act has provisions that address access concerns among pipeline
providers, programmers and consumers.1 88
185. 47 U.S.C. § 521(b)(1)-(5) (Supp. V 1993). The provision states:
Statement of Policy. It is the policy of the Congress in this Act to -
(1) promote the availability to the public of a diversity of views and infor-
mation through cable television and other video distribution media;
(2) rely on the marketplace, to the maximum extent feasible, to achieve
that availability;
(3) ensure that cable operators continue to expand, where economically
justified, their capacity and the programs offered over their cable systems;
(4) where cable television systems are not subject to effective competi-
tion, ensure that consumer interests are protected in receipt of cable ser-
vice; and
(5) ensure that cable television operators do not have undue market
power vis-a-vis video programmers and consumers.
Id.
186. Note that this Article will only discuss the 1992 Cable Act's provisions
which create access duties. For a detailed discussion of the 1992 Cable Act, see
Allard, supra note 177.
187. 47 U.S.C. § 521(b)(1)-(5) (Supp. V 1993).
188. Antitrust laws are another way to effectuate the 1992 Cable Act's goals.
"Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to
alter or restrict in any manner the applicability of any Federal or State antitrust
law." Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 27, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
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a. Access
To handle the access problems created by vertical and hori-
zontal integration, sections twelve 89 and nineteen1 90 of the 1992
Cable Act were enacted. Section twelve has three provisions that
regulate the ability of the pipeline providers to control program-
mers.19' First, a pipeline provider cannot condition carriage of a
189. Section 12 adds § 616: Regulation of Carriage Agreements, to Part II of
Title VI of the Communications Act of 1934. Section 12 provides:
(a) Regulations. Within one year after date of enactment of this section,
the Commission shall establish regulations governing program carriage
agreements and related practices between cable operators or other mul-
tichannel video programming distributors and video programming ven-
dors. Such regulations shall -
(1) include provisions designed to prevent a cable operator or other
multichannel video programming distributor from requiring a financial
interest in a program service as a condition for carriage on one or more
of such operator's systems;
(2) include provisions designed to prohibit a cable operator or other
multichannel video programming distributor from coercing a video pro-
gramming vendor to provide, and from retaliating against such a vendor
for failing to provide, exclusive rights against other multichannel video
programming distributors as a condition of carriage on a system;
(3) contain provisions designed to prevent a multichannel video pro-
gramming distributor from engaging in conduct the effect of which is to
unreasonably restrain the ability of an unaffiliated video programming
vendor to compete fairly by discriminating in video programming distri-
bution on the basis of affiliation or nonaffiliation of vendors in the selec-
tion, terms, or conditions for carriage of video programming provided by
such vendors; ....
(b) Definition. As used in this section, the term "video programming
vendor" means a person engaged in the production, creation, or whole-
sale distribution of video programming for sale.
Pub. L. No. 102-385 § 12, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 536 (Supp.
V 1993)).
190. Section 19 adds § 628: Development of Competition and Diversity in
Video Programming Distribution, to Part III of Title VI of the Communications
Act of 1934. Section 19 provides:
(a) Purpose. The purpose of this section is to promote the public inter-
est.., by increasing competition and diversity in the multichannel video
programming market, to increase the availability of satellite cable pro-
gramming and satellite broadcast programming to persons in rural and
other areas not currently able to receive such programming, and to spur
the development of communications technologies.
(b) Prohibition. It shall be unlawful for a cable operator.., to engage in
unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices,
the purpose or effect of which is to hinder significantly or to prevent any
multichannel video programming distributor from providing satellite
cable programming or satellite broadcast programming to subscribers or
consumers.
Pub. L. No. 102-385 § 19, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 548 (Supp.
V 1993)).
191. Note that a pipeline provider can prohibit programs that the "cable op-
erator reasonably believes describes or depicts sexual or excretory activities or or-
gans in a patently offensive manner as measured by contemporary community
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program on its acquiring a financial interest in a programmer. 192
This prevents a pipeline provider from using its power to acquire
vertical interests in programmers. Second, a pipeline provider can-
not condition carriage of a program on its pipeline by requiring an
exclusive license to the programs. An exclusive program license
makes a program unavailable to competing pipeline providers,
causing difficulty for competitive pipeline providers to attract con-
sumers to its pipeline.193 Third, vertically integrated programmers
and pipeline providers cannot unreasonably restrain an unaffiliated
programmer's ability to distribute its programs by discriminatory se-
lection, terms or conditions for carriage of the unaffiliated pro-
grams. 194 Although these provisions regulate the relationship
between pipeline providers and programmers, the consumers bene-
fit by increased availability of pipelines and programs.
Section nineteen promotes the public's interests by increasing
competition and diversity in the pipeline providers. 195 In further-
ance of its goals, section nineteen prohibits a vertically integrated
satellite programmer and pipeline provider from selling its pro-
grams at discriminatory prices, terms or conditions to nonaffiliated
pipeline providers.196
b. Must Carry/Retransmission Consent
Under the 1992 Cable Act, broadcasters can either insist on
carriage ("Must Carry") or bargain for carriage ("Retransmission
Consent"). The Must Carry provisions are stated in sections four1 97
standards." 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (Supp. V 1993). Although this provision limits ac-
cess by a programmer to a pipeline, the United States Supreme Court has held that
obscene and indecent language can be regulated. Generally, the Court has not
accorded First Amendment protection to obscenity. See Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity totally lacks any redeeming social value). It has ex-
tended non-protection to include indecent language broadcast over radio stations
because its exposure to children cannot be regulated. See FCC v. Pacifica Founda-
tion, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (radio broadcast of George Carlin's "Filthy Words" mon-
ologue can be regulated).
192. 47 U.S.C. § 536(a) (1) (Supp. V 1993).
193. Id. § 536(a) (2).
194. Id. § 536(a) (3).
195. Id. § 548(a). Although the purpose of this section and its stated prohibi-
tions seem inconsistent, the only other current method of video program distribu-
tion is satellite. For a list of possible alternative pipeline providers, see supra note
170.
196. 47 U.S.C. § 548(c) (2) (A)-(B) (Supp. V 1993).
197. Section four amends Part II of Title VI of the Communications Act of
1934 by adding § 614: Carriage of Local Commercial Television Signals. Section
four provides:
(a) Carriage Obligations. Each cable operator shall carry, on the cable
system of that operator, the signals of local commercial television stations
1995] 297
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and five.19 8 Retransmission Consent is stated in section six.199 The
and qualified low power stations as provided by this section. Carriage of
additional broadcast television signals on such system shall be at the dis-
cretion of such operator ....
(b) Signals Required. -
(1) In general. (A) A cable operator of a cable system with 12 or fewer
usable activated channels shall carry the signals of at least three local
commercial television stations, except that if such a system has 300 or
fewer subscribers, it shall not be subject to any requirements under this
section so long as such system does not delete from carriage by that sys-
tem any signal of a broadcast television station.
(B) A cable operator of a cable system with more than 12 usable acti-
vated channels shall carry the signals of local commercial television sta-
tions, up to one-third of the aggregate number of usable activated
channels of such system.
Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 4(a)-(b), 106 Star. 1460 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 534(a)-(b) (Supp. V 1993)).
198. Section five, which amends Part II of Title VI of the Communications Act
of 1934, by adding § 615: Carriage of Noncommercial Educational Television.
Section five provides:
(a) Carriage Obligations .... [E]ach cable operator of a cable system
shall carry the signals of qualified noncommercial educational television
stations in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(b) Requirements To Carry Qualified Stations -
(1) General requirement to carry each qualified station. Subject to
paragraphs (2) and (3) and subsection (e), each cable operator shall
carry, on the cable system of that cable operator, any qualified local non-
commercial education television station requesting carriage.
(2) (A) Systems with 12 or fewer channels. [A] cable operator of a cable
system with 12 or fewer usable activated channels shall be required to
carry the signal of one qualified local noncommercial educational televi-
sion station ....
(3) Stations with 13 to 36 channels. (A) Subject to subsection (c), a
cable operator of a cable system with 13 to 36 usable activated channels
(i) shall carry the signal of at least one qualified local noncommercial
educational television station but shall not be required to carry the sig-
nals of more than three such stations, and
(ii) may, in its discretion, carry additional such stations ....
(e) Systems With More Than 36 Channels. A cable operator of a cable
system with a capacity of more than 36 usable activated channels which is
required to carry the signals of three qualified local noncommercial edu-
cational television stations shall not be required to carry the signals of
additional such stations the programming of which substantially dupli-
cates the programming broadcast by another qualified local noncommer-
cial educational television station requesting carriage ....
Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 5 (a)-(b), 106 Star. 1460 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 535
(a)-(b) (Supp. V 1993)).
199. Section six governs retransmission consent for cable systems. It provides:
(b) (1) [Nlo cable system or other multichannel video programming dis-
tributor shall retransmit the signal of a broadcasting station, or any part
thereof, except -
(A) with the express authority of the originating station; or
(B) pursuant to § 614 [Must Carry provision], in the case of a station,
electing, in accordance with this subsection, to assert the right to carriage
under such section.
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Must Carry provisions give broadcasters and noncommercial educa-
tional programmers 00 mandatory carriage rights on a pipeline.
Under section four of the 1992 Cable Act, the number of man-
datory broadcast signals carried by a cable operator is determined
by the number of available channels in a pipeline. A cable operator
with more than twelve channels is required to carry signals of li-
censed local commercial broadcast television stations if the over-
the-air broadcast signals serve the same television market as the
cable operator.20 1 However, a cable operator need not devote
more than one-third of its active channels to local broadcasts. 202 If
there are not enough commercial broadcast stations to fill the re-
quired one-third set aside, the cable operator has to carry one or
two qualified low power broadcast signals.2 03 A cable operator with
twelve or fewer channels must carry the signals of at least three local
commercial broadcast stations.204 However, if a cable operator has
300 or fewer subscribers, the cable operator is exempt from the
Must Carry provision.20 5
Section five requires cable operators to carry signals of
noncommercial educational broadcast stations.20 6 Generally, a
cable operator must carry all noncommercial stations that request
carriage, unless that station's program substantially duplicates that
of a station already being carried by the cable operator.20 7 How-
ever, a cable operator with twelve or fewer channels is required to
carry only one noncommercial station.20 8 Similarly, a cable system
with thirteen to thirty-six channels must carry between one and
three noncommercial stations.2°9
The Retransmission Consent provision 210 prohibits pipeline
providers from carrying broadcast television programs without get-
Pub. L. No. 102-385 § 6, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 325 (Supp.
V 1993)).
200. Noncommercial educational television broadcast stations include those
owned and operated by a public agency, nonprofit foundation, corporation or as-
sociation. 47 U.S.C. § 535 (Supp. V 1993). This section amends Part II of Title VI
of the Communications Act of 1934 by inserting § 615 after § 614.
201. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d) (3) (i) (1994).
202. 47 U.S.C. § 534(b) (1) (B) (Supp. V 1993).
203. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 74.701-74.781 (1994).
204. 47 U.S.C. § 534(b) (1) (A) (Supp. V 1993).
205. Id.
206. Id. § 535(a).
207. Id. § 535(b), (e).
208. Id. § 535(b)(2)(A).
209. Id. § 535(b) (3) (A) (i).
210. Although the Retransmission Consent provision addresses intellectual
property concerns and not access concerns, this Paper describes Retransmission
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ting the consent of the programmers. 21' The Must Carry and Re-
transmission Consent provisions are inter-related. A programmer
can either insist on mandatory carriage by a pipeline provider at no
cost to either party or negotiate an agreement with the pipeline
provider on terms of carriage.
The Must Carry/Retransmission Consent provisions are seen
by the cable operators as the most problematic provisions of
the 1992 Cable Act.2 12  In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Consent for two reasons. First, Retransmission Consent affects the ability of a pipe-
line provider to get access to a program. Second, Retransmission Consent and
Must Carry are generally discussed together.
211. 47 U.S.C. § 536 (Supp. V 1993).
212. Other provisions of the 1992 Cable Act have also been challenged as
invalid. In Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, cable operators and program-
mers challenged 11 provisions of the 1984 and 1992 Cable Act as "unconstitution-
ally interfer[ing] with their First Amendment right to 'speak' as they wish through
the cable television systems they own, control or use, to the audiences of their
choice." 835 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993). The challenge to the Must Carry provi-
sions brought in Daniels Cablevision was consolidated in Turner Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC, 810 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1992).
In Daniels Cablevision, the cable operators argued that the provisions inter-
fered with "their ability to design the packages of services that they would like to
offer their subscribers." 835 F. Supp. at 6. In addition, the programmers argued
that the provisions "ma[de] it more difficult for operators to carry the products of
certain programmers, and in consequence prevent[ed] the programmers from
reaching their optimum audience." Id. The United States District Court for the
District of Columbia first held that § 7(b) of the 1992 Cable Act (requiring
mandatory carriage of public, educational, and governmental programming),
§ 612(b) of the 1984 Cable Act (leased access provision requiring cable operators
to reserve channel capacity for use by commercial programmers that are unaffili-
ated with the operator), § 19 of the 1992 Cable Act (prohibiting vertical integra-
tors to discriminate in the prices, terms and conditions of sale or delivery of cable
programming between cable systems), and § 3 of the 1992 Cable Act (rate regula-
tion) were constitutional. Additionally, the court determined that these regula-
tions were content-neutral. Id. at 7. As a content-neutral regulation, the
regulation had to serve a significant governmental interest and not burden sub-
stantially more speech than necessary to serve these interests. Id. at 10 (citing
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). The court held that these provisions met the intermedi-
ate level of scrutiny. Id. at 11-12. Next, the court held that § 10(d) (abrogating
statutory immunity from liability that private cable operators formerly enjoyed for
transmission of obscenity), § 7(c) (immunizing municipally owned cable operators
from civil liability to private competitors for money damages) and § 6 (Retransmis-
sion Consent) failed to implicate significant First Amendment rights. Id. at 10-12.
However, the court held that three provisions of the 1992 Cable Act were unconsti-
tutional because they impose content-related burdens on speech or they did not
serve any identifiable regulatory purpose. Section 25 required that direct broad-
cast satellite providers allocate four to seven percent of their transmission capacity
to noncommercial programming of an educational nature. This failed intermedi-
ate scrutiny because it did not serve any significant governmental regulatory or
market-balancing function. Id. at 8. Section 15 required cable operators to give
subscribers at least 30 days advance notice for free preview of premium channels of
movies rated X, NC-17 or R by the Motion Picture Association of America. The
court found that § 15 was a content-based regulation and failed to meet the strict
[Vol. II: p. 261
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FCC,2 13 Turner Broadcasting System (TBS) challenged the constitu-
tionality of the Must Carry provisions2 14 as a violation of its First
Amendment rights.2 15 The United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia granted summary judgment against TBS and held
that the Must Carry provisions did not violate the First Amend-
ment.2 1 6 Although the Supreme Court agreed with the district
court's use of an intermediate standard in determining the consti-
tutionality of the provisions, the case was remanded because the
Court held that the district court erroneously granted summary
judgment while many factual issues were unresolved. 21 7
The Supreme Court held that the appropriate standard to eval-
uate the constitutionality of the Must Carry provisions was the inter-
mediate level of scrutiny. The intermediate level of scrutiny applies
to content-neutral restrictions that impose an incidental burden on
speech. 218 The Court noted that the Must Carry provisions "do not
pose such inherent dangers to free expression, or present such po-
tential for censorship or manipulation, as to justify application of
the most exacting level of First Amendment scrutiny."219 Under
scrutiny standard. The statute was not narrowly tailored to meet substantial gov-
ernmental interests. Id. at 9. Section 11(c) regulated the number of subscribers a
cable operator is authorized to reach. The court held that the quota on the
number of subscribers a cable operator may reach violated its right to reach the
minds of any willing listener. Id. at 10.
213. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
214. Must Carry provisions are embodied in sections four and five.
215. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 37 (D.D.C. 1993).
The cable operators asserted three reasons for the unconstitutionality of the Must
Carry provisions. First, they claimed that the provisions forced the cable operators
to carry certain programs and to decrease the total number of channels available
for programs the cable operators wish to carry. Id. at 38. Second, they asserted
that the provisions inhibited their editorial discretion to determine the message of
the programs. Id. Third, they asserted that the provisions gave broadcasters pre-
ferred speaker status "by awarding them favored cable channel positions." Id.
216. Id. at 51.
217. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2472. The Court stated that the factual questions
that remained were: (1) jeopardy of the broadcast television industry, (2) actual
effects of Must Carry on the speech of cable operators and programmers, (3) the
degree to which cable programmers will be dropped from cable systems to make
room for local broadcasters, and (4) the extent to which cable operators can satisfy
their Must Carry obligations by devoting previously unused channel capacity. Id.
218. Id. The Court rejected the government's argument that regulation of
cable television should be analyzed under the less rigorous First Amendment stan-
dard for broadcast television. Id. at 2456. The broadcast standard is not applicable
to cable television because the physical problems of spectrum scarcity and signal
interference existing in the broadcast medium do not exist in the cable context.
Id. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 395 (1969).
219. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2469.
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United States v. O'Brien,220 a content-neutral regulation221 will be sus-
tained if "it furthers an important or substantial governmental in-
terest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the further-
ance of that interest."222 In addition, the regulation need not be
the least restrictive method, as long as the regulation "promotes a
substantial governmental interest that would be achieved less effec-
tively absent the regulation."223
The Court also noted that the government's interest in regulat-
ing cable was substantial. 224 These interests were "(1) preserving
the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television, (2) pro-
moting the widespread dissemination of information from a multi-
plicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in the market
for television programming."22 5 The Court additionally held that
none of these interests suppressed free expression.226
c. Rate Regulation
Section three2 27 of the 1992 Cable Act reflects congressional
concern with the forty-five to fifty percent increase in cable access
fees to the consumers after the 1984 deregulation. However, in the
220. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
221. The Court held that the Must Carry provisions were content-neutral
because the regulation did not distinguish among speakers in the television pro-
gramming market, and the regulation was based on the manner in which the pro-
grammers transmitted their messages, not the messages they carry. Turner, 114 S.
Ct. at 2460. As stated by the Court, "laws that confer benefits or impose burdens
on speech without reference to the ideas or views expressed are in most instances
content-neutral." Id. at 2459. The Must Carry provisions "on their face, impose
burdens and confer benefits without reference to the content of speech." Id. at
2460.
222. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
223. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2469 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against'Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
224. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2469.
225. Id. (citations omitted).
226. Id.
227. Section three, which amends § 623 provides that:
(2) Preference for competition. If the Commission finds that a cable sys-
tem is subject to effective competition, the rates for the provision of cable
service by such system shall not be subject to regulation by the Commis-
sion or by a State or franchising authority under this section. If the Com-
mission finds that a cable system is not subject to effective competition -
(A) the rates for the provision of basic cable service shall be subject to
regulation by a franchising authority, or by the Commission if the Com-
mission exercises jurisdiction ....
Pub. L. No. 102-385 § 3, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 543 (Supp.
V 1993)).
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furtherance of Congress' goal of managed competition, cable oper-
ators are not subject to rate regulation if effective competition
exists.
228
3. Duties Created by the 1992 Cable Act
The 1992 Cable Act model is analyzed by determining the du-
ties and rights it creates on the three groups who want access to the
video marketplace - the pipeline providers, programmers and
consumers. Generally, the 1992 Cable Act allows the marketplace
to regulate the cable industry.2 9 However, this act imposes a duty
to correct any imbalance of power or discriminatory behavior
among cable operators, programmers and consumers.2 30 The 1992
Cable Act regulates only the cable operators; however, this Com-
ment assumes that the 1992 Cable Act regulates the consumers,
programmers and pipeline providers in the video marketplace.
A pipeline provider has differing duties to programmers, com-
petitive pipeline providers and consumers. Generally, a pipeline
provider cannot condition carriage of a program upon three crite-
ria.23 1 First, a pipeline provider is prevented from requiring a fi-
nancial interest in a programmer as a condition of carriage of a
program. This provision prevents further vertical integration in the
cable industry. Second, a pipeline provider is prohibited from re-
quiring exclusive rights to a program as a condition of carriage.
228. Id. A cable operator faces effective competition if: (1) fewer than 30% of
households in the franchise are subscribers to the service of a cable system; (2)
cable systems and other unaffiliated multichannel distributor each offer compara-
ble programming to at least 50% of the households in the franchise area, and 15%
of the households actually subscribe to multichannel distributors other than the
largest distributor; or (3) local franchising authority itself operates a multichannel
distributor that offers programming to at least 50% of the households in the
franchise area. Id. Under these rules, most cable systems today are not subject to
effective competition and are subject to rate regulation. Allard, supra note 177, at
351.
229. Unlike the common carrier model, the 1992 Cable Act is more complex.
For example, in the common carrier model, a pipeline provider is required to
provide nondiscriminatory access to all programmers. Under the 1992 Cable Act
model, the duties of a pipeline provider to a programmer are more complex.
Under this model, a pipeline provider must set aside a certain number of its pipe-
line channels for "favored" programs, but is under no obligation to provide access
to all programmers. However, the pipeline provider cannot discriminate based
upon affiliation or non-affiliation with the pipeline provider, when choosing the
programs it will carry.
230. In the cable industry, a cable operator can provide both the pipeline and
program, resulting in vertical integration.
231. Although these provisions regulate the relationship between a pipeline
provider and programmer, the provisions also increase the number of pipelines
and programs available to the consumers.
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Third, a pipeline provider cannot discriminate on the basis of affili-
ation or non-affiliation with the pipeline provider in the selection,
terms or conditions of carriage of a program.232 This provision al-
lows programmers nondiscriminatory access to a pipeline, regard-
less of their affiliation with the pipeline provider.
In addition, certain programmers, such as local commercial
television stations, qualified low power stations and noncommercial
educational programmers, are given special carriage rights on the
pipeline.233 These programmers can invoke the Must Carry provi-
sion and require the pipeline provider to carry their signals. 234 A
pipeline provider cannot request payment for carriage.23 5
Furthermore, a pipeline provider cannot carry a signal of a
broadcast programmer without its approval. The Retransmission
Consent provision allows the pipeline provider to require a fee for
carriage of a program. Other than these restrictions, a pipeline
provider is free to choose the programs it carries.
The 1992 Cable Act also regulates the relationship between a
pipeline provider and competitive pipeline providers. The pipeline
provider-pipeline provider relationship is regulated to promote
competition and increase the number of pipeline providers.23 6 The
1992 Cable Act promotes increased competition among the pipe-
line providers by increasing the number of programs available to
competing pipeline providers.2 37 Section 536(2), which prohibits
exclusive program licensing as a condition for carriage, increases
232. This provision corrects the problems associated with a vertically inte-
grated pipeline provider by requiring a pipeline provider to provide access in a
nondiscriminatory fashion to non-affiliated programmers.
233. Congress determined that it has a substantial interest in making these
programs available on the cable system. 47 U.S.C. § 521(a) (2) (7)-(9) (Supp. V
1993).
234. A pipeline provider must reserve a certain number of channels to carry
the preferred programs. That number is dependent upon the total number of
channels available on the pipeline, but the total number of reserved channels does
not have to exceed one-third of the pipeline's total channel capacity.
235. 47 U.S.C. § 534(b) (10) (Supp. V 1993). The pipeline provider can re-
quest compensation for costs associated with delivering a quality signal to the prin-
cipal head of the cable system, carrying distant signals which result in increased
copyright liability or continuing carriage of agreement entered into prior to June
26, 1990. Id. § 543(b) (10) (A)-(C).
236. Increasing competition among the pipeline providers also benefits the
consumers. Consumers will have increased choice in selecting a pipeline and its
associated programs.
237. For a pipeline provider to succeed, it must offer programs to which con-
sumers desire access. For example, a college whose curriculum only consists of
unpopular courses would not be able to compete effectively with a school that
offers a broad curriculum, which indudes courses in business, engineering and
fine arts.
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the total number of programs available to competitive pipeline
providers. Likewise, a cable operator, or a cable operator with an
attributable interest in a satellite cable programming vendor, can-
not use unfair methods of competition or unfair acts to hinder dis-
tribution of programs on a satellite pipeline.
To correct the disparity in power between a cable operator and
a consumer, the 1992 Cable Act includes a provision on rate regula-
tion. Congress expressed a preference for competition to control
the rates. Absent effective competition, the provision authorizes
the regulation of rates. However, noticeably missing is any equal
access obligation to the pipeline. 238 A consumer does not have a
right to request equal access to a pipeline.
The 1992 Cable Act regulates the programmer-pipeline pro-
vider relationship to a small degree.239 A satellite cable program-
mer240 cannot "engage in unfair methods of competition or unfair
or deceptive acts or practices" 241 that hinder significantly a satellite
pipeline provider from reaching its subscribers. Congress has again
recognized the importance of the availability of programs in a pipe-
line provider's ability to compete effectively with other pipeline
providers.
Otherwise, a programmer is free from regulation. Unlike its
affiliated pipeline provider, a vertically integrated programmer may
discriminate. 242 A programmer can refuse to allow a nonaffiliated
pipeline provider from carrying its signals. No provisions prohibit a
programmer from requiring a financial interest in a pipeline pro-
vider as a condition of carriage of its program. Likewise, a
programmer can coerce a pipeline provider not to carry competing
programs.
238. The 1992 Cable Act does include a provision which states that
"[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed as prohibiting any Federal
agency, State, or a franchising authority from - (1) prohibiting discrimination
among subscribers and potential subscribers to cable service . . . ." 47 U.S.C.
§ 543(e) (Supp. V 1993). Therefore, it is possible that a future regulation will
guarantee equal access to the pipeline to the consumers.
239. Regulation of programmers can conflict with First Amendment rights as
a content-based regulation. A discussion of First Amendment rights and program-
mer control are beyond the scope of this Paper. See generally Perritt, supra note 15;
Access and Content Control, supra note 27.
240. Satellite cable programmers include satellite cable programmers in
which a cable operator has an attributable interest and satellite broadcast
programmers.
241. 47 U.S.C. § 548(b) (Supp. V 1993).
242. A vertically integrated pipeline provider is prohibited from discriminat-
ing against nonaffiliated programmers.
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The consumers are protected against the market power of a
pipeline provider by the threat of rate regulation in the absence of
competition, but the 1992 Cable Act does not provide consumer
protection against programmers. A possibility exists that some pro-
grams may become crucially important to the public, such as the
telephone system.243 The telephone service in the electronic media
is electronic mail.244 Customers pay for access to electronic mail to
communicate electronically to other users on the service. By sever-
ing access to electronic mail, the programmer has cut off the ability
of consumers to communicate to others.245 Although these
problems are of concern, regulating programmers can run afoul of
First Amendment rights.2 46
IV. COMPARISON OF THE VIDEO DIALTONE ORDER AND THE 1992
CABLE AcT IN THE PIPELINE PROVIDER-
PROGRAMMER MARKETPLACE
As a comparison of the Video Dialtone Order and the 1992
Cable Act,24 7 this Comment describes the duties created in one
market, the pipeline provider-programmer market. In the pipeline
provider-programmer market, a pipeline provider sells the chan-
nels available on its pipeline to programmers. Hypothetically, con-
sider a situation where a pipeline provider, TCI, has a pipeline
capacity of thirty-six channels where six of its channels are currently
used to carry programs of local commercial television stations. TCI
also owns a financial interest in a sports programmer called Sports
243. In essence, the telephone companies provided the pipeline, channels
and programs, resulting in the service necessary to allow two people to talk to each
other.
244. Some would consider a termination from an electronic mail account as
equivalent to "solitary confinement." Livingston, supra note 156, at 25. For a dis-
cussion of CompuServe threatening to cancel a user's account, see supra note 156.
245. This would be similar to telephone companies providing a channel with-
out the ability to speak with other users on the pipeline.
246. Regulation of programmers can conflict with the First Amendment. Re-
quiring access to a program is different than content-based regulation. By al-
lowing access to a program, the availability of ideas to the public is increased, and
,furthers the First Amendment goals of "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" de-
bate on public issues. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). A
full discussion of First Amendment implications and programmer control are be-
yond the scope of this Paper. See generally Perritt, supra note 15; Access and Con-
tent Control, supra note 27.
247. Keep in mind that the Video Dialtone Order regulates the telephone
companies in the video marketplace, and the 1992 Cable Act regulates the cable
operators in the video marketplace. For purposes of this comparison, this Paper
assumes that the Video Dialtone Order and the 1992 Cable Act regulates both the
telephone and cable industries.
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R US. Programmers ESPN and WPV1248 desire to purchase chan-
nels on the pipeline. ESPN is a sports programmer. WPVI is a
programmer with special status as a local commercial broadcast
station. 249
Under the Video Dialtone Order, TCI has to sell its available
channels both to ESPN and WPVI. ESPN and WPVI are treated
similarly. Under common carrier requirements, the price of a
channel is set by a tariff filed with the FCC, and TCI may not dis-
criminate unreasonably among its customers in charges, practices,
classifications, regulations, facilities or services.
The Video Dialtone Order does not have a specific channel
capacity requirement. It does require TCI to have "sufficient capac-
ity to service multiple video programmers."25 ° Nonetheless, TCI
can decline to carry either ESPN or WPVI if TCI does not have any
available channel capacity. Note also that TCI cannot actively par-
ticipate in selecting the programs available on its pipeline.
Under the 1992 Cable Act, TCI's obligation to sell available
channels on its pipeline is more complicated. First, TCI must deter-
mine if a programmer has special carriage status. TCI does owe a
special carriage duty to WPVI because it is a local commercial
broadcast station.251 As such, WPVI can invoke the Must Carry pro-
vision 252 and require TCI to carry its program. Under Must Carry,
TCI is required to transmit the signals of local commercial televi-
sion stations, up to one-third of the total number of usable activated
channels in the pipeline. 253 TCI has thirty-six channels and must
devote up to twelve channels, if necessary, to local commercial tele-
vision stations. Currently, TCI carries six local commercial televi-
sion stations; therefore, it must carry WPVI's programs.254
248. WPVI provides ABC broadcast programs in the Philadelphia, PA vicinity.
249. For purposes of clarity, this Paper uses commonly known pipeline prov-
iders and programmers. These could be any number of pipeline providers and
programmers.
250. Video Dialtone Order, supra note 13, at 41,107.
251. Programmers that are given special carriage rights are local commercial
television stations, qualified low power stations and noncommercial educational
programmers.
252. In Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, cable operators challenged the
constitutionality of the Must Carry provisions as violative of their First Amendment
rights. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994). For a discussion of Turer, see supra notes 213-26
and accompanying text.
253. If TCI had 12 or fewer channels, TCI would be required to carry at least
three local commercial television stations. However, if TCI had twelve or fewer
channels and had 300 or fewer subscribers, TCI would be exempt from section
four. Noncommercial educational programmers are covered under section five.
254. If TCI already carried 12 local commercial broadcast stations, TCI could
refuse to carry WPVI's programs. Note that the 1992 Cable Act does not prohibit
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However, WPVI does not have to insist on carriage. Under the
Retransmission Consent provision, WPVI can bargain for car-
riage255 because the provision prohibits TCI from distributing
WPVI's programs without WPVI's consent. Prior to the 1992 Cable
Act, TCI could carry WPVI's signal without prior authorization by
WPVI.
While TCI owes both a special and general duty to WPVI, TCI
only owes a general duty to ESPN. First, TCI cannot condition car-
riage of ESPN on TCI's ability to gain a financial interest in ESPN.
Second, TCI cannot condition carriage of ESPN upon ESPN grant-
ing TCI an exclusive carriage agreement. Third, TCI cannot dis-
criminate against ESPN in the selection, terms or conditions of
carriage which unreasonably restrain ESPN's ability to compete
fairly in the distribution of programs against TCI's affiliated
programmer, Sports R US. Other than these three restrictions, TCI
has the freedom to decide whether to sell a channel to ESPN, to
choose its pipeline content and to determine the contractual rela-
tionship between TCI and the programmers.
The 1992 Cable Act customarily gives a pipeline provider
greater flexibility in choosing the content of the programs carried
by its pipeline. Moreover, under the 1992 Cable Act, a pipeline
provider does not have to file a tariff governing the terms of car-
riage between a pipeline provider and programmer. The 1992
Cable Act, however, is more complex than the Video Dialtone Or-
der in determining the duties of a pipeline provider to sell its chan-
nels to a programmer. Under the Video Dialtone Order, a pipeline
provider is required to provide common carriage access.
V. CONCLUSION
As Vice President Al Gore stated, "[g]iven the pace at which
networking technology is changing, our efforts will demand more
than just vision, leadership and commitment. Flexibility and a will-
ingness to change the details of the plan while constantly moving
forward will be required."256 Accordingly, three key principles must
be kept in mind when regulating the video marketplace.
TCI from using more than one-third of its channels for local commercial broadcast
stations. Therefore, if TCI currently carried 12 local commercial broadcast sta-
tions, which fulfills its requirement to use one-third of the channels for local com-
mercial broadcast stations, TC1 can still carry ABC.
255. Although this Paper discusses Retransmission Consent as an access provi-
sion, it deals primarily with intellectual property concerns.
256. Gore, supra note 6, at 153.
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First, any regulation must recognize the importance of compe-
tition in the marketplace. Competition fosters lower prices, innova-
tion and improved services. Second, when no competition exists,
regulation must balance the market power among the pipeline
providers, programmers and consumers. Third, the regulation
must be flexible.
Today, there is a convergence of the cable and telephone mar-
kets. "With digitalization all of the media become translatable into
each other - computer bits migrate merrily - and they escape
from their traditional means of transmission. A movie, phone call,
letter, or magazine article may be sent digitally via phone line, coax-
ial cable, fiber optic cable, microwave, satellite, the broadcast air, or
a physical storage medium such as tape or disk."257 This conver-
gence in technology requires that the regulation be flexible to ac-
commodate innovations.
The Video Dialtone Order and the 1992 Cable Act are a good
start in this direction. Both signify a shift in congressional and FCC
regulatory policy in the telecommunications market from a man-
aged monopoly to managed competition.258 Congress has noted
the importance of the marketplace but balances competition
against the public policy goals of access. These models have rele-
vance in the video market place and the broader NII, therefore,
they should be kept in mind as the NII strategy is developed.
257. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 44, § 14.2, at 695 (citing OFFICE OF TECHNOL-
OGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, CRITICAL CONNECTIONS: COMMUNICATIONS FOR
THE FUTURE 50 (1990)).
258. "For better or worse, we are moving toward a new regulatory paradigm,
one of competition rather than quarantine, competition rather than price regula-
tion, plenty rather than scarcity." Id. § 1.11, at 75. Regulation should be imposed
when competition does not work.
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